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How would a wealth maximizing absolute ruler 
behave towards his constituents?  He can confiscate all 
their wealth, but such a once-and-for-all accumulation is 
inconsistent with maximization over time. . . . He can get 
more income by promising to let constituents keep a 
portion of their incremental output. However the ruler 
continually faces a tradeoff between the higher income he 
can obtain by relaxing restrictions on constituents (thereby 
increasing their productivity and both their and his income) 
and the increasing threat to his security that the relaxed 
restrictions entail because his subjects have both more 
freedom of action and resources to overthrow him.  
Equally the constituents face the dilemma that the ruler 
may at some point renege on his promises and confiscate 
the accumulated wealth of his constituents.  It is at this 
point that . . . credible commitment[s] enter the picture.1 
 
Just as the rule of the game will determine how well a ruler may 
maximize his wealth, North's fable demonstrates that institutions or 
institutional constraints are the determinant of economic performance.  
Institutions, particularly political and legal institutions, may improve 
economic performance by reducing uncertainty and establishing a stable 
structure within which political and economic players interact, a process we 
call "making institutional commitments credible." 2   Since, from the 
 
1 Douglass C. North, Institutions and Credible Commitment, 149 J. INST. THEO. ECON. 11, 17 
(1993). 
2 DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 5-6 (1990). 
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constituents' standpoint, the key to credibility is how well the ruler will 
honor his promise not to confiscate their accumulated wealth, the 
enforcement of property rights is therefore central to credible commitment.3   
China's economic performance since 1978 has been nothing but 
spectacular, especially compared to that of the former Soviet Union or 
those of the formerly socialist economies in Eastern Europe.  When Deng 
Xiaoping, the then paramount leader of China, launched the economic 
reform by announcing "let some people get rich first,"4 he was less certain 
about the how-tos other than to "cross the river by groping for stepping 
stones."5  Three decades later, Deng's reform has been lauded by some as 
having engineered the monumental transformation of one-fifth of 
humanity6 and praised by others, who are awestruck by China's prescient 
determination not to follow advice from neo-liberal economic theorists, as 
a successful example of adopting a "homegrown" gradualist approach.7  
Thus, it is clear that China's economic growth at break-neck speed has 
brought enormous prosperity, wealth and pride to its people.   
Yet, like the "wealth maximizing absolute ruler" in North's fable, 
Deng was not immune to the threats to the political security of his party-
state.  When the student-led demonstrators poured into Tian'anmen Square 
in the summer of 1989, without hesitation, he moved quickly to crush them.  
Deng was not the first and certainly not the last in China's history to have 
succeeded in fostering economic prosperity while tightly maintaining 
sovereign supremacy.  Such tradition may be traced back to the First 
Emperor of Qin who proceeded to burn unorthodox books and bury 
dissenting scholars promptly upon unifying China in 221 B.C., thereby 
setting the foundation for standardized political and economic systems of a 
dynastic China for the next two millennia.  More than ten years have 
passed since Deng's death in 1997 and much has changed in China.  Yet, 
much remains the same.  The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), once a 
self-claimed revolutionary rebel, now clenches onto the two-millennia-old 
authoritarian wisdom exemplified by the First Emperor and perfected by 
Deng.  To stay true to this tradition, the CCP remains steadfast in following 
the blueprint envisioned by Deng:  "Socialism with Chinese characteristics 
 
3 North, supra note 1, at 17. 
4 Weixing Chen, Has the Time Come for a New Ideology in China? The Creation of a New 
Authoritative Discourse, 1998 CHINA REV. 259, 271.  
5  RICHARD BAUM, BURYING MAO: CHINESE POLITICS IN THE AGE OF DENG XIAOPING 17 
(1994). 
6 David Shambaugh, Introduction: Assessing Deng Xiaoping's Legacy, in DENG XIAOPING, 
PORTRAIT OF A CHINESE STATESMAN 1, 1 (David Shambaugh ed., 1995). 
7 See e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 186 (2003) (stating 
that "[o]ne attribute of the success cases is that they are 'homegrown,' designed by people 
within each country, sensitive to the needs and concerns of their country.  These and all 
other successful transitioning countries were pragmatic - they never let ideology and simple 
textbook models determine policy."). 
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(有中国特色的社会主义)."8  Laden with vagueness and ambiguity, the 
convenient phrase has been defined by the party-state to mean a full-scale 
market economy coupled with the CCP's monopoly on political power, a 
sermon not only preached but also practiced by the CCP.  Economically, 
China has been liberalized, but politically, it has stagnated under the one 
party rule.  Along with marketization came deepened social polarization 
and stratification, mounting grievances among the poor and the weak, not 
to mention rapid environmental degradation.   
Setting aside the enormity of human costs, China seems to have 
succeeded in its economic performance without undertaking the kind of 
institutional rearrangements prescribed by the "liberal democratic" 
development model - privatization and civil and political liberties as 
preconditions for stable economic growth.  For those who deem the moral 
of North's fable sensible, three issues figure prominently: Firstly, did China 
nonetheless achieve credible commitment in its institutional arrangements 
without having to privatize its property rights? Secondly, depending on the 
answer to the first question, will China ultimately privatize its property 
rights, however gradually, in order to either achieve or, alternatively, 
maintain the credibility to accommodate changes in its economy?  Last but 
not least, will China's economic marketization bring about civil and 
political liberalization?    
Confucius once said, rectification of names (正名) is a matter of 
paramount importance in carrying an affair to success.9  The CCP may have 
taken this advice to heart when it reaffirmed public property ownership 
through the passing of its new property law in March 2007 (the "Property 
Law"). After all, the Chinese translation of the "Communist Party" means 
the "Party of Public Property Ownership."  As such, deciphering the true 
meaning and rectifying the name of "Socialism with Chinese 
characteristics" may be the key to answering the three questions.  
Originally a rhetorical slogan that reflected the collective ethos such as "old 
things must be put to present use" and "foreign things must be put to 
Chinese use" – the use of this term has been understood by many as having 
a prescriptive value imposed by the CCP with its ideological pretense and 
also a descriptive value reflecting what has taken place in China 
empirically.  Others, eschewing the Orwellian sentiment inevitably invoked 
by it, wonder whether the phrase has a genuine normative value.  Many 
have written about China's de facto capitalism, brushing off the party-
state's insistent socialist claim.  Many more have speculated on how soon 
 
8 RICHARD EVANS, DENG XIAOPING AND THE MAKING OF MODERN CHINA 252–53 (1994). 
9 See THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS B. 13 V. 3 (James R. Ware trans., 1980) ("If names be 
not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things.  If language be not in 
accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success[.]  Therefore 
[w]hat the superior man requires is just that in his words there may be nothing incorrect."). 
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socialism will fully recede from China's social milieu.  But perhaps in the 
minds of many pragmatic Chinese, the question should no longer be "What 
-ism does China practice?"  A more apt question concerns what it means to 
have "Chinese characteristics."  If both "capitalism" and "socialism" are 
well-defined and China's development model is genuinely sui generis, then 
the features of this model would be embodied in what "Chinese 
characteristics" come to represent.  However, "[c]onsiderable haziness 
surrounds"10 this term.  Speculations abound that its ambiguity as well as 
the institutions it represents may prove to be the wisdom of the CCP in 
evading challenge, maximizing institutional flexibility and allowing trials 
and errors.11  Could it mean the dual-track economic system under which 
continued operation of the state sector was allowed while giving space to a 
rapidly growing private sector?  Or is it merely a codeword for Chinese 
pragmatism as epitomized by Deng's proclamation that "it does not matter 
if it is a white cat or a black cat, as long as it catches mice?”12 
Against this backdrop, this paper intends to address the three issues 
posed above, i.e., credible commitment, privatization of property rights, 
and political liberalization, by analyzing China's legal institutional 
arrangements of the most essential kind of property rights, real property 
interests, within the institutional economics theoretical framework 
proposed by North.  Part II of this paper begins with a historical overview 
of the real property systems that existed in dynastic China as influenced by 
its cultural traditions.  It follows with a chronicle of the major land use 
policies and laws engineered by the CCP since 1949, including the 
Household Responsibility System (包产到户承包制) ("HRS") initiated in 
1978 and completed in 1982, which played a pivotal role in Deng's 
economic reform, and the Property Law.  Part III analyzes the interplay 
between China's economic performance and the institution of property 
rights.  This part asks whether China's current property law system has 
achieved credibility by decentralizing and fragmenting real property 
interests, and concludes that it has.  This part also ponders the question of 
whether privatization of rural land ownership would benefit the next stage 
of China's development.  It finds that such privatization may not be the best 
course of action, as the cost of doing so outweighs the benefits it promises 
to offer.  Part IV considers the practical implications that the current real 
property law has on Chinese society, through land related grievances in 
 
10 Steven N. S. Cheung, Will China Go "Capitalist"? An Economic Analysis of Property 
Rights and Institutional Change, HOBART PAPER 21 (1982). 
11 See id.; see also Peter Ho, Who Owns China's Land? Policies, Property Rights and 
Deliberate Institutional Ambiguity, 166 CHINA Q. 394, 420 (2001) (concluding that China 
deliberately implements ambiguous policies to reconcile Marx-Leninist principles with 
privatization of land).   
12  WILLIAM A. JOSEPH, Ideology and Chinese Politics, in POLITICS IN CHINA: AN 
INTRODUCTION 129, 155 (William A. Joseph ed., 2010). 
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both urban and rural settings.  It questions whether the awakening of the 
concept of property rights within its people, notwithstanding the party-
state's tenacious grasp at the regime's legitimacy, will eventually lead to 
political institutional change and help achieve democratization in China.  It 
ends on an optimistic note: "Hope is on the way," to borrow from recent 
American politics.  Palpable throughout this paper is an attempt to decipher 
what "Socialism with Chinese characteristics" means within the context of 
China's legal, economic and political development.   
II.  PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LAND USE SYSTEMS IN CHINA 
In River Elegy, a provocative TV documentary aired in China in 
1988 which created the intellectual effervescence leading to the 1989 
Tian'anmen student movement, Chinese civilization was called a land-
based "Yellow Civilization," vis-à-vis the maritime-based "Azure 
Civilizations" of the West.  Despite its pervasive sensationalism, the 
documentary rightly highlighted the indispensability of land, the most 
significant asset of the mankind, in defining a person's existence in 
traditional China and people's interactions with the state.         
Institutions are "humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction," according to North.13  There are two forms of constraints - 
formal and informal.  Formal constraints are "formal rules including 
political (and judicial) rules, economic rules, and contracts;" and informal 
constraints are, for instance, "codes of conduct, norms of behavior, and 
conventions." 14   For this reason, my review of China's institutional 
arrangements of property rights begins with a legal review and closes with 
a cultural overview.  
A. Property Rights and Land Use Systems in Traditional China 
1. A Brief Legal Overview 
Before China's unification by the First Emperor of Qin in 221 B.C., 
a feudal style system of land use distribution existed at least since the 
Shang dynasty (16th C B.C. - 11th C B.C.), under which all the land was 
owned by the king, the granted use rights were enjoyed by nobles, military 
officers and public officials, and other people were serfs who passed with 
the land.15  During the subsequent Western Zhou dynasty (11th C B.C. - 
770 B.C.), the land grant became transferable and the grantees became the 
 
13 NORTH, supra note 2, at 3–4. 
14  Id. at 36, 46. 
15 PATRICK A. RANDOLPH JR. & LOU JIANBO, CHINESE REAL ESTATE LAW 1–2 (1999). 
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de facto owners of the granted land.16  A land management system known 
as the "well" system (井田制度)17 was developed in the Eastern Zhou 
dynasty (770 B.C. - 221 B.C.), under which the entire parcel was owned de 
facto by the grantee of the land but each of the eight surrounding outer 
sections was allotted to an individual or a family to cultivate while the 
center section, the communal section, was also cultivated by all eight 
parties; in exchange, the parties could keep the proceeds or products from 
their own sections while handing over the proceeds or products from the 
center section to the de facto owner of the parcel.18   
The quasi-private land ownership concept continued to develop 
during the Eastern Zhou Dynasty and was conferred additional security by 
the First Emperor of Qin, who issued an order requiring all peasants to 
report their private land and recognized their ownership.19  Subsequent 
dynasties also continued the practice of distinguishing state land, which 
was owned by the Emperor and could not be transferred, from private land 
of which free transferability was encouraged.20  The Song Dynasty (10th C 
A.D.) developed a rough land registration system under which land 
ownership was represented by a government issued certificate.21  After a 
brief reversion to the feudal system during the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368) 
under the Mongols, a comprehensive land survey system was established 
by the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), together with the formalization of laws 
concerning real estate ownership, transfer, and the concept of dian (典) (or 
mortgage), which was first recognized during the Song Dynasty.22  The last 
dynasty of China, the Qing Dynasty established by the Manchu, witnessed 
a redistribution of large amounts of land to the Manchu people to the 
detriment of the Han Chinese.  However, to encourage agricultural 
development, efforts were taken by the government to confirm the private 
land ownership of the peasants.23   
A brief interlude called the "Taiping Rebellion" is worth noting.  
For more than ten years starting from 1851, significant regions of southern 
China were controlled by a theocratic and militaristic regime known as the 
"Taiping Kingdom," established through the Taiping Rebellion.24  The 
 
16 LAW SCHOOL TEXTBOOK SERIES: THE HISTORY OF CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEM (法学系列教材：
中国法制史) 42 (1985). 
17 The Chinese character for the word "well" is 井, representing the division of the land into 
nine equal sections.  Zhihou Xia, Well-Field System, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/639289/well-field-system (last visited Mar. 14, 
2011). 
18 RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 15, at 2. 
19  THE HISTORY OF CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 16, at 96. 
20  RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 15, at 4. 
21 Id. 
22 TEXTBOOK OF CHINA'S LEGAL HISTORY 233 (Ye Xiao Yin ed. 1989). 
23 Id. at 249. 
24 JOHN KING FAIRBANK, THE GREAT CHINESE REVOLUTION 1800-1985 81 (1986). 
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regime abolished private land ownership, declared collective land 
ownership by all people and allowed peasants who worked on the land the 
right to use it.25  Some viewed the Taiping Rebellion an inspiration for Mao 
Zedong in resorting to peasant uprising and revolutionary policies such as 
communal land ownership.26 
2. A Brief Cultural Overview 
North believes that "culture defines the way individuals process 
and utilize information and hence may affect the way informal constraints 
get specified."27  Further, he emphasizes the important role played by the 
long-run implication of the cultural processing of information in the 
incremental way by which institutions evolve. 28   For that reason, he 
identifies "culturally derived informal constraints" as a source of path 
dependence.29 
As William Alford notes, even though China's legal history goes 
back to before the establishment of the Western Zhou Dynasty in the 12th 
C B.C., as evidenced by the development of rules regarding civil matters 
during the Zhou Dynasty, a code of conduct evolved from the concept of li 
(礼) (or rites).  Li, originating at least during the Western Zhou, became the 
public rules governing the political, social and religious behaviors of the 
pre-imperial society.30  Confucianism, relying on concepts such as li though 
with lesser emphasis on religious rituals than before, was declared the 
"supreme principle of government and moral conduct" in 140 B.C. by Han 
Wu Di.31  It served as the cultural foundation for Chinese society and 
shaped the "mentality and conduct of the Chinese, both individually and as 
a collectivity."32 Law (法), on the other hand, originated from a secondary 
philosophical school, Legalism, which was relegated  to an instrumentality 
by which the sovereign governed through punishing wrongdoings. 33  
Despite the development of private law in traditional China, social and 
 
25 RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 15, at 5-6. 
26 PAUL A. COHEN, CHINA UNBOUND: EVOLVING PERSPECTIVES ON THE CHINESE PAST 212 
(2003); see also Orville Schell, Unheavenly Kingdom, N.Y. TIMES, Feb, 4, 1996 (reviewing 
JONATHAN D. SPENCE, GOD'S CHINESE SON: THE TAIPING HEAVENLY KINGDOM OF HONG 
XIUQUAN (1996)). 
27 NORTH, supra note 2, at 42. 
28 Id. at 44-45. 
29 Id. 
30 William P. Alford, The Inscrutable Occidental? Implications of Roberto Unger's Uses 
and Abuses of the Chinese Past, 64 TEX. L. REV. 915, 930 (1986). 
31 ZHENGHUAN ZHOU, LIBERAL RIGHTS AND POLITICAL CULTURE: ENVISIONING DEMOCRACY 
IN CHINA 140 (2005). 
32 Id. at 166. 
33 STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE:  LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 15-16 
(1999).  
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economic relations were predominantly enforced through reliance on 
informal norms based on social hierarchy.34  The informal norms and the 
regime's public law system were not in opposition.  Rather, the ideals 
expressed in the social norms were more or less reflected in the public law 
system and reliance upon public law did not obviate the need for such 
norms.35  As Alford further observes, "[p]ublic, positive law was meant to 
buttress, rather than supersede, the more desirable means of guiding society 
and was to be resorted to only when these other means failed to elicit 
appropriate behavior."36   
Pierre Gourou marvels at the durability and effectiveness of the 
institutional framework within which the traditional peasantries of the Far 
East existed. 37   He remarks that, imbued with the Confucian moral 
principles, the social framework "compris[ed] the family, the clan, the 
village and the state." 38   He further notes that "[a] texture of local 
institutions (that might be regarded as the 'weft') and a hierarchy of political 
institutions belonging to the state (that could be looked on as the 'warp') 
created a vast and durable woven framework that made [Chinese] 
civilization particularly effective, in controlling vast numbers of people 
spread over vast territories, for thousands of years."39  Contrary to a 
perhaps more popular view that traditional Chinese society was ruled by an 
autocratic government with absolute authority, he believes, "the peasants 
found in the traditional Chinese set-up some degree of protection against 
despotism; [b]ecause the institutions were more powerful than individuals, 
and the political framework depended on institutions rather than on the 
whims of a king[.]"  To prove his view, he points out that "serf-dom was 
abolished in China long before it disappeared from Europe.”40 
B. Property Rights and Land Use Law in Modern China 
1. Pre-1949 
The 1911 Xinhai Revolution overthrew the imperial Qing and 
founded the Republic of China (the "ROC").  Although, ideologically, the 
ROC was founded upon Dr. Sun Yat-sen's "Three Principles of the People," 
in reality, the central government was unable to implement land reform or 
 
34 PITMAN B. POTTER, THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: GLOBALIZATION AND LOCAL LEGAL 
CULTURE 8-9 (2001). 
35  WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 944 (1995). 
36 Id. at 10. 
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wealth redistribution.  Endless political and military turmoil between the 
government, the warlords, the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) and the CCP 
marked the early years of the ROC rule.  China remained largely agrarian, 
with most land in the countryside owned by landlords.  Under the civil law 
concept of yong dian quan (永佃权), the right to the surface of the land 
belonged to the peasants while the basic ownership of the land, called tian 
di quan (田地权), rights to the subsurface of the land, belonged to the 
landlord.41  Under this system, the peasants actually enjoyed inheritable 
rights to continue in possession so long as they paid their rent to the 
landlord.42  In the countryside, most land was owned by landlords who 
leased land to the peasants in exchange for rent, often in the form of crops 
or other products rather than in cash.43  Land in the urban areas were 
categorized as (1) leased land to foreign countries or individuals under the 
so-called "unfair treaties," (2) public land owned by government agencies, 
(3) land privately owned by various commercial entities including domestic 
real estate companies, (4) land owned by other social entities, such as 
religious societies, and (5) privately owned residential urban homestead 
land.44   
Despite disagreements among top authorities within the CCP, from 
very early on, Mao Zedong realized the key to the CCP's success lay in the 
peasantry.45  In 1921, to appease peasants and to maximize incentives for 
the peasants, the CCP experimented with various land policies in areas it 
controlled.  Under the Land Law of the China Soviet Republic, adopted in 
1931, all land was confiscated by the government except that owned by 
poor peasants.46  In 1942, the Decisions on Land Policies were adopted, 
which provided for private land ownership, presumably used to motivate 
productivity by the peasants.  Also, related legislative rules confirming 
private ownership were issued, as were land ownership certificates. 47  
Following victory in the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1945, the policy of 
 
41 PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW 351 (Zhang Jun Hao ed., 1991). 
42 Id. 
43 RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 15, at 8. 
44 Id. at 7-8. 
45 Mao Tse-tung, Report on an Investigation on Peasant Movement in Hunan, in SELECTED 
WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 23 (1967). In March 1927, after conducting investigations in five 
counties in Hunan Province, Mao Zedong wrote an article entitled "The Importance of the 
Peasant Problem" where  he urged that, "[a]ll talk directed against the peasant movement 
must be speedily set right.  All the wrong measures taken . . . concerning the peasant 
movement must be speedily changed.  Only thus can the future of the revolution be 
benefited. For the present upsurge of the peasant movement is a colossal event.  In a very 
short time, in China's central, southern and northern provinces, several hundred million 
peasants will rise like a mighty storm, like a hurricane, a force so swift and violent that no 
power, however great, will be able to hold it back. . . Every revolutionary party and every 
revolutionary comrade will be put to the test, to be accepted or rejected as they decide." Id.     
46 RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 15, at 6. 
47 Id. at 7. 
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confiscating private land from landlords and redistributing the land to 
peasants was resumed by the CCP.  In the Shan-gan-ning liberated area, the 
CCP negotiated to buy land from landlords for redistribution purposes and 
paid the landlords with bonds.48  By reallocating the surplus previously 
captured by the landlord class to peasants, the land reform created "a 
population of independent cultivators with roughly equal small holdings."49 
2. From 1949 to the 1978 Reform 
Once the People's Republic of China (PRC) was founded, a 
sweeping socialist transformation in China began in earnest until it was 
abruptly halted by the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).  In the early 
1950s, the CCP aimed to establish the so-called Socialist Public Land 
Ownership System by nationalizing the urban real property ownership and 
simultaneously collectivizing rural land ownership.  The PRC's first 
constitution, adopted in 1954, embodied the fundamental principles of this 
land ownership and redistribution system.50  
In rural areas across China, the CCP expanded the scope of its very 
successful land reform policies based on its experience of the two 
preceding decades. 51   The rural population was then categorized into 
various classes, and the landlord class was identified as the enemy of the 
people and the revolution.52  The CCP continued its policy of confiscating 
landlords' holdings and distributing them to the peasants through more 
widespread and at times ruthless class struggle.53  As confirmed by the 
Revised Draft of the Operational Regulations on Rural People's 
Communes, promulgated in 1962, private ownership was completely 
eliminated after the establishment of the cooperatives, even though 
peasants continued to own their residential houses. 54   At first, the 
 
48 TEXTBOOK OF CHINA'S LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 22, at  416. 
49 MARK SELDEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHINESE DEVELOPMENT 69 (M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 
1993). 
50 Art. 4 of the 1954 Constitution declares that the PRC is set out to gradually eliminate the 
system of exploitation and build a socialist society through socialist industrialization and 
reformation. XIANFA art. 4 (1954) (China).  The 1954 Constitution generally provides that 
the state shall protect the ownership rights of peasants of rural land and allow a mixture of 
ownerships over urban real properties. Id. The 1954 Constitution does not specifically 
provide for ownership in land. Art. 8 provides that "[t]he state protects the right of peasants 
to own land and other means of production according to law."  XIANFA art. 8 (1954) (China). 
It also provides that "[t]he policy of the state toward rich peasant economy is to restrict and 
gradually eliminate it." Id. 
51 SELDEN, supra note 49, at 57. 
52  Benjamin James, Expanding the Gap: How the Rural Property System Exacerbates 
China's Urban-Rural Gap, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 459 (2007). 
53 Many landlords were publicly attacked, punished and even executed during the struggle 
and their surviving families were condemned as having "bad class” status. See id. at n.23.    
54 See RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 15, at 16. 
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collectivization of the land was greeted by the peasants with resistance as 
they were used to working on their small lots.  Encouraged by the increased 
productivity, the CCP created lower-level agricultural producers' 
cooperatives, with each cooperative consisting of approximately thirty-five 
households whose members pooled land and farming tools.55  In 1956, 
higher level cooperatives were created which averaged about 160 
households per unit, and peasants were asked to give up their title to land as 
well as to other means of production.56  As of the end of 1956, the 
percentage of higher-level cooperatives reached ninety percent.57  By 1958, 
the CCP's ideological fervor to leap over the capitalism stage as predicted 
by Marx pushed rural collectivization to an extreme through the Great Leap 
Forward.58  As many as five thousand households were organized into one 
giant commune in which all were required to contribute according to the 
best of his or her ability and receive food and other necessities of life in 
exchange.59  The resulting famine caused by the CCP's disastrous mis-
management led to the death of over thirty million people from 1959 to 
1961.60   Blame for the failure divided the CCP's top leadership and 
criticisms against Mao Zedong propelled him to launch the Cultural 
Revolution in early 1966. 
Upon occupying urban areas in 1949, the CCP moved to transform 
the urban real property ownership through confiscation, conversion and 
compulsory acquisition.  Since all available resources were needed to 
reconstruct and govern the urban economy, care was given to allow a 
mixed ownership.61  The CCP's policy at that time was to abolish the 
system of exploitation.62  Consequently, urban real estate holdings owned 
by the so-called "bureaucratic capitalists, war criminals, traitors, and 
counter-revolutionaries" were confiscated in accordance with the 
"Instructions on Confiscating the Property of War Criminals, Traitors, 
Bureaucratic Capitalists and Counter-revolutionaries" and the "Provisions 
on Confiscating the Property of Counter-revolutionary Criminals" that were 
 
55 James, supra note 52, at 458. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. See also SELDEN, supra note 49, at 58. 
58 James, supra note 52, at 459. 
59 Id. at 459-60. 
60 Id. at 460. 
61 Art. 5 of the 1954 Constitution permits four types of ownerships of the means of 
production:  State ownership; collective ownership; individual proprietary ownership; and 
capitalist ownership. XIANFA art. 5 (1954) (China).  Art. 11 provides for the protection of 
citizens' ownership rights in personal and real property, including housing. XIANFA art. 11 
(1954) (China).  Art. 12 allows the right to devise their private assets. XIANFA art. 12 (1954) 
(China). For a general discussion on the urban real property land reform, see William D. 
Soileau, Past is Present: Urban Real Property Rights and Housing Reform in the People's 
Republic of China, 3 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 299 (1995). 
62 See RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 15, at 14. 
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promulgated in January 1951.63  A more gradual and gentler system was 
utilized to convert the real estate owned by the urban national bourgeoisie 
or urban capitalist companies.  The system enabled compulsory 
government acquisition of the shares of former capitalist owners in their 
businesses, including real estate interests through a policy known as "State-
Private Joint Management of Private Businesses."64  The confiscated or 
converted property interests were allocated to state-operated enterprises, 
government agencies, public societies and urban laborers.65  In 1956, the 
CCP issued the "Opinions on the Current Situation of Urban Private-owned 
Buildings and Their Socialist Transformation," which helped achieve 
nationalization of all real property owned by private real estate agents or 
urban real estate proprietors.66  In 1964, two reports were promulgated by 
the State Council to confirm the socialist transformation of the privately-
owned real property in cities and towns.67  Private ownership of urban 
residential properties of urban citizens remained until 1982, when the 
second Constitution was adopted, which pronounced state ownership of all 
"urban land."68 
The early land reform efforts by the CCP were short-lived.  As the 
nation swirled into the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, many privately-
owned houses in the cities were illegally confiscated or seized and state or 
collectively owned houses were forcefully occupied or illegally 
destroyed.69  In the meantime, more than seventeen million urban youth, 
approximately one tenth of the urban population at the time, were sent 
down to the countryside and became members of the communes. 70  
Collectivization was sustained throughout the rural areas during the 
Cultural Revolution, with the exception of the sporadic revival of private 
 
63 See Report:  Institution of Finance and Trade Economics, Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, and Institute of Public Administration, New York, U.S.A.: "Urban Land Use and 
Management in China", 290. 
64 See RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 15, at 9.  The authors note, even though the state ought 
to pay an annual return to the former owners under this system, the payment system was 
rendered defunct as the owners "voluntarily surrendered" their claims for such payments. Id. 
65 Id. at 15. 
66 Id. The authors point out that the socialist transformation of this type of real estate was 
through the "State Trusteeship," under which the state was to operate the privately-owned 
real property and pay 20% to 40% of the rent it received to the former owners for a period 
of time, usually 15 - 20 years, and upon the expiration of such period, the state was to 
become the owners of such property.  In reality, however, the payment period was severely 
shortened and, in any event, ended in 1967 when the Cultural Revolution commended. Id.   
67 See Report on Enhancing the Administration for Buildings Belonging to the Whole People 
and Report Concerning the Socialist Transformation of Leased Private-owned Land. 
68 XIANFA art. 10 (1982) (China). 
69 RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OVER REAL PROPERTY AND REAL PROPERTY DISPUTES (房地产权益
与纠纷) 73 (Intellectual Press 1991). 
70 Videotape: Up to the Mountain, Down to the Village (Small Handful Production 2005) 
(on file with Fung Library, Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University). 
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lots following the famine of the early 1960s and the subsequent 
abolishment of such revival in many regions.71 
3. The Era of Deng's Economic Reform 
Soon after the ending of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, Deng 
Xiaoping became the de facto paramount leader of China.  A set of reform 
policies ensued in 1978.  In China's vast rural areas, encouraged by the 
successful outcomes of regional experiments, the CCP reinstated the 
Household Responsibility System (HRS).72  The HRS proved the "ultimate 
solution in reconciling the Chinese state's ideological premises – state and 
collective ownership of the means of production – with the bare necessity 
of having to revive the agricultural sector dampened by years of 
collectivism."73  Under the HRS, individual households, the most basic 
social unit throughout traditional Chinese society and in rural China to 
date, could enter into contracts with the collective to obtain the right to 
farm certain amount of land, in exchange for a certain portion of the 
produce.74  The term of the contract was initially for three years and was 
extended to fifteen years in 1984 to induce more investment from peasant 
households into the land.75  During the term of the contract, the right to the 
land was made inheritable.76  The success of the HRS lay in its aim to 
stimulate peasants' incentives, the lack thereof having been the chief vice of 
collectivization.  As Peter Ho points out, even though decentralization 
under the HRS led to an extreme fragmentation of land resources and its 
management, the introduction of the HRS certainly increased agricultural 
productivity in China, at least initially.77  The increased rural productivity 
 
71 SELDEN, supra note 49, at 239 n.2. 
72 Some privatization activists believe that the nationwide adoption of this policy was a 
direct result of an event known as the "spontaneous land reform" secretly carried out by a 
small group of peasants in December 1978 in Xiaogang village in Anhui Province. See 
Jamil Anderlini, Losing the countryside: a restive peasantry calls on Beijing for land rights, 
FIN. T., February 19, 2008. 
73  Peter Ho, Introduction: The Chicken of Institutions or the Egg of Reforms, 
DEVELOPMENTAL DILEMMAS: LAND REFORM AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN CHINA 1, 9 
(Peter Ho ed., 2005). 
74 NORMAN STOCKMAN, UNDERSTANDING CHINESE SOCIETY 137 (Polity Press 2000).  
75 James, supra note 52, at 461. 
76 Id. 
77 Ho, supra note 73, at 11.  According to Ho, after a few years of the implementation of the 
HRS, collective land was contracted to over 160 million households with an average of 
around 0.5 ha per family.  Furthermore, a survey in the early 1980s indicates that, the family 
land was frequently scattered over as many as 11 to 15 small plots of widely varying quality 
in terms of fertility, topography and texture.  See id.  From 1979 to 1984, the gross value of 
agricultural output increased at an annual rate of 7.6 percent and grain production rose by 
4.9 percent annually.  See Scott Rozelle, Loren Brandt, Li Guo & Jikun Huang, Land Tenure 
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also fostered the emergence of the so-called town and village enterprises 
("TVEs") which had become the backbone of China's economic miracle 
during the reform era.  By the early 1990s, the number of the TVEs 
exceeded one million across rural China, accounting for nearly one-fourth 
of the nation's industrial employment.78 
Ideologically, the CCP was steadfast in maintaining the state and 
collective land ownership.  In 1982, a new constitution was enacted to 
reaffirm this principle.  Article 6 of the 1982 Constitution provides that: 
"The basis of the socialist economic system of the People's Republic of 
China is socialist public ownership of the means of production, namely, 
ownership by the whole people and collective ownership by the working 
people."  Article 10 clarifies that: "Land in the rural and suburban areas is 
owned by collectives except for those portions which belong to the state in 
accordance with the law; house sites and private plots of cropland and hilly 
land are also owned by collectives.  The state may in the public interest 
take over land for its use in accordance with the law.  No organization or 
individual may appropriate, buy, sell or lease land, or unlawfully transfer 
land in other ways.  All organizations and individuals who use land must 
make rational use of the land."  Similarly, the National People's Congress 
("NPC") issued China's first Land Administration Law (土地管理法) in 
1984, which became effective in 1987. 79   The law proclaimed that 
"collective land is collectively owned by the peasants of the village and is 
managed and administered either by rural collective economic organization 
such as the village agricultural producers' collectives (村农业生产合作社) 
or by villagers' committee (村民委员会)."80     
While emphasizing the collective notion of the rural land 
ownership, the CCP was also mindful of maintaining the individual 
incentives created by the HRS and the increasing insecurity felt by the rural 
households as the fifteen year contract term stipulated in 1984 was soon to 
expire.  As Scott Rozelle, et al., point out, the sagging productivity 
experienced by the farm economy from 1985 to 1994 was due to the 
weaknesses in the institutional arrangements, which had called for either 
land privatization or for extending land contracts to thirty years or more.81  
In 1997, the Secretariat of the CCP and the State Council issued a directive 
 
in China: Facts, Fictions and Issues, DEVELOPMENTAL DILEMMAS: LAND REFORM AND 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN CHINA 107, 122 (Peter Ho ed., 2005).   
78 James, supra note 52, at 462. 
79 SELDEN, supra note 49, at 189. 
80 Tudi Guanli Fa (土地管理法) [Land Administration Law] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Jun. 25, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987) (China).  
81 Rozelle et al., supra note 77, at 122.  The authors observed, from 1985 to 1994, the 
productivity experienced a deceleration and the grain output during that period rose only 0.9 
percent per year. Id. 
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that prescribed a stable lease period free from allocations for thirty years.82  
This principle was embodied in the Revised Land Administration Law of 
1998.83  In Rural China, the HRS has proven successful, as it effectively 
motivated rural productivity without causing misuse of land resources, 
while rallying widespread social support from the rural populace.84  
The Law on Rural Land Contracting was adopted in 2002 to clarify 
the operational system and the technical details of rural land contracting.  It 
states that the "two-tier management system" combines "centralized and 
decentralized management on the basis of household contractual 
management."85  It also stipulates the rights and obligations of the parties 
under the contract.86  While offering protection to the long-term stability of 
the relationships of the contracting of rural land, 87 the law also made it 
clear that the nature of the contract is a lease, not a sale or purchase, and 
that ownership of the land belongs to the collective.88  The law made it 
easier for farmers to transfer their contract rights as long as the land use 
remained for agricultural purposes.      
In addition to the so-called "responsibility land" (责任田), there are 
four other major types of land tenures existing in China's rural areas: ration 
land (口粮田 ), contract land (承包田 ), private plots (自留地 ) and 
reclaimed land (开荒田).89  Responsibility land describes land allocated to 
farm households on the basis of the number of family members, the number 
of laborers in each family, or desire and/or ability of the household to 
engage in agricultural production.  In exchange for use rights, farmers must 
deliver a mandatory quota to the state as a price below-market.90  Ration 
land is land allocated to farm households typically on the basis of 
household size for the purpose of ensuring that each household is self-
sufficient in producing grain, the use of which does not typically incur fees 
or other obligations.91  Private plots are parcels of land acquired by the rural 
household during the period of collective agriculture and retained with the 
implementation of HRS.  Today this is mainly the land in courtyards, and 
not the private plot under collective times, since in many villages private 
 
82  Ho, supra note 73, at 12–13.   
83 Revised Land Administration Law § 14, as amended (China).  Since becoming effective 
on January 1, 1987, this law has been amended three times, in 1988, 1998 and 2004. 
84 Ho, supra note 73, at 14. 
85 Nongcun Tudi Chengbao Fa (农村土地承包法) [Law on Rural Land Contracting] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Congr., Aug. 29, 2002, effective Mar. 
1, 2003) 5 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 347, ch. 2 (2002) 
(China), art. 1. 
86 Id. 
87 Id.  
88 Id. arts. 3 & 4. 
89 Rozelle et al., supra note 77, at 123–24. 
90 Id. at 124. 
91 Id. 
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plots are now collectively cultivated.  Households enjoy almost complete 
control over short- and long-term management of such plots with the 
exception of the right of title transfer.92  Contract land is land contracted out 
to households by the villages for a fixed fee.  Village leaders may set fees 
on these plots ex ante or farmers may have to bid on the land at a 
community auction.93  Lastly, reclaimed land is land to which farmers 
acquire use rights through efforts to reclaim previously uncultivated land.  
For such land, there are not usually obligatory deliveries or fees tied to the 
use of the land.94  Although tenure types are not uniform throughout 
China's villages, a 1992 survey by the State Statistical Bureau demonstrates 
that responsibility land covered 84.5 percent of cultivated land, ration land 
made up only 8.4 percent and, nationwide, farmers only cultivated 6.2 
percent of their land as private plots.95   
As reiterated in the 1982 Constitution, "[l]and in the cities is owned 
by the state." 96   As a result, the Chinese government has not only 
consistently prohibited sale of state owned land, but has also been 
extremely cautious about avoiding the use of terms such as “sale” or 
“lease”. 97   The Land Administration Law stipulates that "the State 
exercises, according to the law, a system of valued use of state-owned 
land."98  As the owner of all state land, the government keeps strict control 
over land transaction through a two-tier urban land market system:  On the 
first-level market (一级市场) the state assigns the use rights of urban state-
owned land to buyers for a fixed period varying from forty to sixty years 
through auction, tender or negotiation; on the second-level market (二级市
场) land users can transfer (转让) or contract (承包) the use rights obtained 
on the first-level market to other users in return for payment.99  The period 
for the transfer cannot exceed the original term stipulated by the first-level 
market.100  
In 1986, the NPC adopted the General Principles of Civil Law to 
reinforce China's civil law tradition and the principles set forth in the 






96 XIANFA art. 10 (1982) (China). 
97 Ho, supra note 73, at 15. 
98 Tudi Guanli Fa (土地管理法) [Land Administration Law] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 1998, effective Jan. 1, 1999) 4 STANDING COMM. 
NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 341, art. 2 (1998)  (China). 
99 Ho, supra note 73, at 16. 
100 Id. at 17. 
101 Minfa Tongze (民法通则) [General Principles of the Civil Law] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Congr., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987) (China) 
[hereinafter G.P.C.L.]. 
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rights to lawfully possess, utilize, profit from and dispose of his 
property"102 and prescribes that, unless otherwise stipulated by law or 
agreed by the parties, "the ownership of property obtained by contract or by 
other lawful means shall be transferred simultaneously with the property 
itself."103  It further states that "state property shall be owned by the whole 
people"104 and that "property of collective organizations of the working 
masses shall be owned by the working masses."105  As Donald Clarke notes, 
the G.P.C.L. provided the basic principles for the operation of a market 
economy by "presuppos[ing] a universe of individual actors making 
decisions based upon free will - the antithesis of the universe of the planned 
economy[,]" but it fell short in providing for detailed rules.106  
The 1982 Constitution was amended in 1988 to incorporate the 
"transferable granted land use right,"107 which was essentially a codification 
of what was taking place in practice.  Shenzhen began this practice by 
selling transferable land use rights on state owned land in 1987 and was 
soon followed by other major cities, such as Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Xiamen 
and Shanghai.108  Local legislation was adopted to allow sale of the granted 
land use rights.109  After the constitutional amendment in 1988 to validate 
this practice, corresponding language was added to the Land 
Administration Law amended in the same year, together with interim 
provisions addressing the creation and transfer of granted land use rights on 
urban land.110  These legislative actions heralded the coming of a booming 
urban real estate market in China.  Newly granted land use rights were 
created for office buildings, luxury hotels and shopping centers, even 
though much of the development occurred without significant mortgage 
financing.111  In 1992, the NPC adopted "Decisions on Establishing the 
Socialist Market Economy System," further signaling the CCP's ideological 
green light to develop the market economy.112  With the CCP's assurance, 
governments at various levels competed amongst themselves in 
establishing the areas in which the acquisition of transferable granted land 
 
102 Id. art. 71.  
103 Id. art. 72. 
104 Id. art. 73. 
105 Id. art. 74. 
106 Donald C. Clarke, Legislating for a Market Economy in China, 191 CHINA Q. 570 (2007). 
107 XIANFA art. 10 (1988) (China). 
108  See RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 15, at 580 n.87. 
109 Id. 
110 1990 Interim Provisions for the Granting and Transfer of Land Use Rights on State 
Owned Urban Land in Cities and Towns; Provisional Regulations Governing Development 
and Operation of Tracts of Land with Foreign Investment (May 19, 1990).  See RANDOLPH 
& LOU, supra note 15, at 580 n.58. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 526. 
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use rights for development purposes were encouraged.113  To cool the over-
heated real estate market, the 1994 Urban Real Estate Administration Law 
imposed clear and strict requirements for planning prior to release of land 
for development and a much tighter control of public giveaways of land use 
rights by regulating the system for pricing those rights.114  To exert tighter 
control over land use management and halt land speculation, the State 
Council General Office issued a circular in 1999 which imposed ceilings on 
permissible construction in cities, villages and townships.115 
China's urban housing system has also undergone a significant 
transformation.  Most city dwellers were employed by various state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) or government agencies and thus, as social welfare 
benefits, were provided with dorm-like apartment units by their work units 
or the government, for virtually no rent.116  As of 1983, public housing 
constituted 88.44 percent of total urban housing at the time.117  As a result, 
there was virtually no incentive among the city populace to invest in 
housing and few granted land use rights for housing were issued.118  Along 
with the emergence of the private sector and the dwindling of the SOEs in 
cities,119 China embarked on a reform to end the city housing welfare 
system.120  Under the reform system, working units no longer distributed 
public housing to their employees.  Instead, public housing that was 
previously distributed were sold or rented to existing residents with 
increased rents in the latter situation, and newly built houses were sold to 
city dwellers.121  State employees were allowed to buy their own homes 
with the aid of subsidies (the amount of which was determined by their 
seniority), public housing reserve funds, bank loans, and their own 
savings.122  In 1995, the Security Law was passed which allowed real estate 
improvements to be used as mortgage collateral.123  In 1999, the Ministry of 




115 Circular of the General Office of the State Council on Strengthening Management of 
Transfer of Land Use Rights and Strictly Banning Speculative Land Dealing, issued on May 
6, 1999.  See RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 15, at 540. 
116 See id. at 549. 
117 Soileau, supra note 61, n.156. 
118 The ratio of allocated land use rights to granted land use rights by 1991 was 99:1. See 
RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 15, at 533. 
119 Joseph Stiglitz observes that, China did not rapidly privatize its state enterprises.  Rather, 
as new enterprises were created, the state ones dwindled in importance, down to merely 28.2 
percent of industrial production twenty years into the reform.  See STIGLITZ, supra note 7, at 
184-85. 
120 RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 15, at 533. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Danbao Fa	 [Security Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
June 30, 1995, effective Oct. 1, 1995) art. 34, § 1 (China). 
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Housing Purchased from Working Units and the Resale of Economic, 
Appropriate Housing," which authorized the resale of housing purchased 
from work units and of other housing purchased at subsidized prices.124  
Notably, the absence of a healthy home mortgage financing system served 
as a significant impediment for a speedy growth of China's housing market.  
Such notwithstanding, by April 2000, the government reported that more 
than half of all urban residents own their own home and 75 percent of these 
had acquired their home in the preceding five years.125  As of early 2007, 
70 to 80 percent of housing is privately owned in Shanghai and other 
coastal cities.126   
In December 2001, more than fifteen years after China had begun 
the process to resume its status as a GATT contracting party, China joined 
the World Trade Organization (WTO).  Although China's commitment to 
conform its laws and regulations to WTO standards and to improve its legal 
system did not directly entail amendments of existing laws and regulations 
relating to land use and real property rights, the principles of transparency 
and uniformity applied.127   In 2004, the Constitution was further amended 
to encourage and provide protection for private property rights,128 paving 
the way for the passing of the Property Law. 
4.  The Property Law of 2007 
a. The Legislative Process 
On October 1, 2007, the much-awaited Property Law became 
effective after a painstaking drafting process.  The law was first drafted in 
1993 and first reviewed by the Standing Committee of the NPC ("NPCSC") 
almost ten years later in 2002.129  In an unusual move, the NPC made the 
draft, considered by many as the "most contentious bill" in PRC's legal 
 
124 RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 15, at 533. 
125 Id. 
126 Dennis M. Horn & Kai Yang, Riding the Chinese Juggernaut, 21-OCT PROB. & PROP. 9 
(2007). 
127 For a discussion of China's commitment to the WTO and its implication on construction 
of rule of law in China, see Cao Jianming, WTO and The Rule of Law in China, 16 TEMP. 
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 379 (2002). 
128 Article 10 of the Constitution was modified to require compensation in the event that the 
state, "for the public interest, expropriate or take over land for public use." XIANFA art. 10 
(1982) (China).  Article 13 was modified to include a statement that "[t]he lawful private 
property of citizens may not be encroached upon" and, more specifically, "[t]he state 
protects by law the right of citizens to own private property and the right to inherit private 
property." XIANFA art. 13 (1982) (China). 
129 See WUQUANFA LIFA BEIJING YU GUANDIAN QUANJI (物权法立法背景与观点全集) 
[PROPERTY LAW COMPLETE LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND AND VIEWS] 4-5 (Law Press 2007). 
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history,130 available to the general public and solicited public comments in 
July 2005.131   During a forty-five day public consultation or "citizen 
legislation," the comments collected from the general public were more 
than ten thousand and there were more than one hundred seminars and 
discussion meetings conducted in order to gather comments from the 
general public, legal scholars and government agencies.132  The draft was 
greeted with heated debates among scholars, party officials and the general 
public, representing the ideological struggles within the country after three 
decades of economic reform.  Supporters of the law believed it would 
protect people's private rights, stimulate their incentives to create wealth 
and enhance social stability.133  Those who resisted centered their rhetoric 
on sensitive political and social issues such as worsening corruption, 
siphoning of state assets and the growing disparity between the rich and the 
poor.134  The most vocal opposition came from left-leaning scholars who 
denounced the draft as "unconstitutional" and accused it as a deceitful 
"betrayal of socialist principles" in an attempt to "cater to the trend of 
capitalist globalization and absurd theories of neo-liberal economics."135  
Oppositions notwithstanding, the law was eventually passed in March 2007 
with much compromise after seven drafts.136 
b. Major Features of the Law  
The 247-article law intends to codify a more expansive notion of 
the property law, by consolidating and updating the pre-existing legal 
system of property rights established over the last two decades, which 
consists of the G.P.C.L., the Land Administration Law, the Urban Real 
 
130 Ting Shi, Debate on ideology defined Property Law's formation: Drafter says political 
wrangling slowed down passing of land bill, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 21, 2007, at 6, 
available at 2007 WLNR 9495752. 
131 See id. 
132 Id. 
133 David Lague, China, in big policy shift, is set to pass property law, INT'L HERALD TRIB., 
Mar. 9, 2007, at 1, available at 2007 WLNR 4502342. 
134 Shi, supra note 130. 
135 See, e.g., Gong Xiantian, yibu weibei Xianfa de Wuquan Fa cao an: wei XianFa di 12 
tiao he 86 nian Minfatongze di 73 tiao de feichu xie de gongkaixin (巩献田, 一部违背宪法
的《物权法<草案>》:为《宪法》第12条和86年《民法通则》第73条的废除写的公开
信) [A Draft Property Law that Violates the Constitution:  Open Letter Written Upon the 
Abolition of Art. 12 of the Constitution and Art. 73 of the 1986 General Principles of Civil 
Law], CHINA ELECTIONS AND GOVERNANCE, Aug. 12, 2005, http://www.chinaelections.org/ 
NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=45986 (last visited April 11, 2008).  
136 For a detailed account of its legislative process, see Su Yonglong, Road to Legislating 
China's Property Law: Never So Tortuous, Never So Resolute, SINOPOLIS.COM, Mar. 23, 
2007, available at http://www.sinofile.net/saiweng/sip_blog.nsf/d6plinks/YZHI-6ZKAZJ 
(last visited April 25, 2008); see also Caught Between Right and Left, Town and Country, 
ECONOMIST, Mar. 8, 2007.  
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Estate Administration Law, the Law on Rural Land Contracting, and the 
Security Law.  While the Property Law covers both immovable and 
movable property, only the immovable (real) property aspect of the law 
will be addressed here. 
Hailed as a "landmark private property measure,"137 the Property 
Law covers three categories of property rights:  Ownership (所有权) (Part 
Two), Usufructuary (用益物权) (Part Three) and Security (担保物权) (Part 
Four).  Ownership means "the right to possess, use, seek profits from and 
dispose of the property."138  For the first time in PRC's history, the principle 
of equal protection is extended to private property, in addition to property 
owned by the state and collectives.139  In a legislative interpretation issued 
by the NPCSC, the emphasis was on the civil law nature of the Property 
Law and, therefore, the civil law principle that the rights of the right-
holders shall be protected equally. 140   In addition to the three well-
established ownership rights, i.e., state, collective and private ownership, 
Part Two of the Property Law deals with additional types of real property 
ownership rights.  Chapter VI concerns owners' partitioned ownership of 
building areas, recognizing the growing importance of the ownership rights 
of urban dwellers who own apartment units for residential or business 
purposes.  Such ownership includes ownership over the exclusive parts 
within the buildings, common ownership and the right of common 
management over the common parts other than the exclusive parts.  
Chapter VII relates to the relationship between adjacent property owners, 
which includes rights to water, drainage, passage, air, and light from the 
owner of an adjacent property.  Chapter VIII regulates common ownership, 
which includes several co-ownership and joint ownership.  Article 42 of the 
law provides that, "where houses and other real properties of entities and 
individuals are expropriated, compensation for demolition and resettlement 
shall be paid according to law in order to maintain the legal rights and 
interests of those whose properties were expropriated; where individual 
residences are expropriated, the residential conditions of those whose 
residences were expropriated shall be guaranteed." 
 
137 Lague, supra note 133. 
138 Wuquan Fa (物权法)	 [Property Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007) art. 39 (China) [hereinafter Property 
Law]. 
139 Article 4, entitled "Equal Protection," provides that "the property right of the state, 
collective, individual or any other right holder shall be under the protection of law, and no 
entity or individual may infringe upon it." Id. art. 4 (China). 
140 Wang Zhaoguo, Deputy Chairman of NPCSC, Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Wuquan Fa (Caoan) de Shuoming (Jielu) (关于《中华人民共和国物权法(草案)》的说明
(节录)) [Clarifications Concerning the Draft Property Law of the PRC] (por.), March 8, 
2007, in WU QUAN FA SHI YONG ZHI NAN (物权法适用指南) 46 (China Legal Publishing 
House 2007). 
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Expanding on and further refining a civil law concept that was first 
used in the G.P.C.L., Part III of the Property Law concerns usufructuary 
rights.141  A usufructuary right is defined as "the right to possess, use and 
seek proceeds from the real property [] owned by someone else in 
accordance with law."142  It allows individuals and other legal persons to 
use the land and other natural resources owned by the state and the 
collectives. 143   Usufructuary rights include right to the contracted 
management of land (土地承包经营权) (Chapter XI), construction land 
use right (建设用地使用权) (Chapter XII), right to use house sites (宅基地
使用权) (Chapter XIII) and easement (地役权) (Chapter XIV).  With 
regard to the right to contracted management of land, it reinforces the two 
tier management system “characterized by the combination of centralized 
operation with decentralized operation on the basis of household contracted 
management" in rural areas.144  It provides that the term of a contract for 
cultivated land shall be 30 years and that the holder of such right may 
renew the term of the contract in accordance with relevant regulations upon 
the expiration of the original term.145  More important, it allows the holder 
of such right to assign, exchange or transfer the right provided such 
transaction is not for non-agricultural use.146  To further protect the holder's 
right, the law prohibits agricultural collectives from readjusting the 
contracted land or taking back the contracted land during the term of the 
contract, and requires corresponding compensation paid to the holder of 
such right in the event that a contracted land is expropriated.147  The 
Property Law does not allow agricultural collectives to sell their land or to 
create granted land use rights.  The intent is to reinforce the legal 
restrictions on the conversion of arable land to non-agricultural use.  As to 
the right to use construction land, the law differentiates the right separately 
established on the surface of or above or under the land,148 regulates the 
creation, transfer, use and mortgage of the right,149 and allows automatic 
renewal of the right to use dwelling houses upon the expiration of its initial 
 
141 This concept was first introduced in Articles 80 and 81 of the G.P.C.L. to address the 
right to use state- and collective-owned land, but without a systemic construction of this 
type of rights.  See G.P.C.L., arts. 80 & 81 (China).  
142 Property Law, supra note 138, art. 117. 
143 See id. ch. 10, General Provisions of Part III. 
144 Id. art. 124.  Benjamin James notes one highly symbolic change made by the Property 
Law in the term it uses to identify contracting farmers.  Unlike the Rural Contracting Law, 
where it calls the contracting farmers "the contracting-undertaking party" (承包方), the 
property law uses a more respectful phrase, "holder of the right to operate the contracted 
land" (土地承包经营权人).  See James, supra note 52, at 474. 
145 Property Law, supra note 138, art. 126. 
146 Id. art. 128. 
147 Id. arts. 130–32. 
148 Id. art. 136. 
149 Id. arts. 137–48. 
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term, which is currently 70 years.150  More specifically, it allows automatic 
extension of land use rights for residential construction.           
The third category under the Property Law is property rights for 
security.  Part IV of the law amends, supplements and updates the Security 
Law with respect to provisions on security interests, and includes the 
general principles and provisions on mortgage (抵押权), pledge (质权) and 
lien （ 留置权).151  It further improves the system of property rights for 
security, extends the scope of collaterals, and revises the rules for the 
realization of security rights.  By amending relevant provisions of the 
Security Law, Part IV of the Property Law offers more protections to a 
mortgagee.  Article 195 permits a mortgagee to request a court to auction 
or sell off the collateral if there is a disagreement between the mortgagee 
and the mortgagor with respect to the method of realization of the 
mortgage.  As a result, the transaction cost for a mortgagee's realization of 
the mortgage will be foreseeably reduced.    
The law adopts a uniform real property registration system in 
Chapter II.  Article 9 requires registration for the creation, change, transfer 
or elimination of the right to real property to be effective.152  Registration is 
carried out by the registration organ of the place where the realty is located 
and the realty ownership certificate is the proof of the holder's 
ownership.153  Article 20 allows advanced notice registration to protect the 
rights of a party under a purchase agreement on a real property by requiring 
consent of the holder in the advanced notice registration before the subject 
real property may be disposed of.  Article 21 allows compensation for 
damages occurring as a result of fraudulent registration.  
c. Assessment of the Law 
Lauded as a milestone in China's legal development, the Property 
Law streamlined and consolidated the fragmented real property and land 
use law into a single comprehensive legal framework.  By officially 
recognizing private ownership in certain real property interests and offering 
equal protection to such ownership, it signals the CCP's determination to 
push the nation forward on the path toward a market economy.  By aiming 
to enhance the much needed clarity and stability of property rights in 
China, it gives confidence to the real property market, which will continue 
to generate real estate developments in urban and suburban areas.  Its true 
genius, however, lies in its ability to achieve these goals without 
 
150 Id. art. 149.  The Property Law does not itself stipulate specific duration periods for these 
rights but leaves that to regulations. 
151 Id. chs. 16–18. 
152 Id. arts. 6 & 9. 
153 Id. arts. 10 & 17. 
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fundamentally challenging the socialist regime.  Consistent with the CCP's 
ideological rhetoric, the "private ownership" recognized under the Property 
Law differs from the "fee simple" concept in the common law tradition as it 
does not connote absolute private land ownership.  Rather, it is a type of 
nonexclusive ownership with less pervasive qualifications, i.e., usufruct.  
This gradual innovation allows private actors to use the land under certain 
conditions and for certain purposes while maintaining the constitutional 
mandate that land belongs to the state or collectives.154  The system before 
the new law was fragmented, ambiguous, inconsistent and lacking 
uniformity, especially in the areas of ownership rights, land use rights, 
mortgage regulations, and the title registration process.  The new law aims 
to correct those shortcomings by offering stronger protection of ownership 
rights, allowing renewal of land use rights, broadening the parameters of 
mortgage regulations, and adopting a uniformed registration process.     
However, since it is a product of political compromise, the 
Property Law is far from perfect.  Lengthy paragraphs affirming the 
supremacy of the "socialist system" and "state ownership" were added in 
the law, as a concession to the leftist critics who opposed private 
ownership.155  From the standpoint of defining land tenure, the law fails to 
specify, among the three levels of a rural collective, the title holder of rural 
land, which will not hamper the rampant problem of land expropriation in 
rural areas. 156   The law does not limit the government's powers to 
appropriate land,157 nor does it address historical land claims that predate 
the land reform of the early 1950s.158  On an operational level, like most 
other legislation in China, the law leaves the details of implementation to 
future laws or regulations, which will likely cause serious enforcement 
problems.  Setting aside the disturbing reality that local governments often 
deviate from enforcing standardized laws and regulations issued by the 
central government and even assuming the provisions of the law will be 
faithfully followed, the ambiguity of the law will result in differing 
interpretations and applications.  This will in turn intensify the lack of 
uniformity in its application across the country.  Another major problem 
relates to the renewal of land use rights.  Even though the law allows 
automatic renewal of the right to use construction land for residential 
purposes, it does not stipulate a specific period for the right but leaves it to 
 
154 XIANFA arts. 6 & 10 (1982) (China).  
155 Shi, supra note 130. 
156 A provision reinstating the lowest collective level as the basic owner of the rural land 
was deleted from the final version of the Property Law.  See a discussion of a draft version 
of art. 135 in PETER HO, INSTITUTIONS IN TRANSITION: LAND OWNERSHIP, PROPERTY RIGHTS, 
AND SOCIAL CONFLICT IN CHINA 195 (Oxford University Press 2005). 
157 Shi, supra note 130. 
158 HO, supra note 156, at 196. 
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regulation by other appropriate governmental agencies.159  Further, it is 
unclear how the renewal process will be carried out, whether it will be 
subject to any conditions or whether a fee will be charged.  There is 
speculation that local and regional governments will have the power to 
exact additional payments at the time of renewal applications.160  The law 
allows the renewal of the use rights of nonresidential properties but details 
of the renewal are left to other legislation.161   
The same uncertainty applies to the provision permitting the 
automatic renewal of the right to use contracted management land in the 
rural areas.  Under the new law, farmers still cannot sell or mortgage their 
plots, which will continue to prevent them from enjoying the fruits of the 
market economy.162  For these reasons, many do not believe the Property 
Law will likely bring about radical change in the way real estate 
transactions are handled in China, even though the effectiveness of the law 
remains to be seen.       
Despite the above-mentioned ideological, jurisprudential and 
technical constraints, China's real property law regime, as codified by the 
Property Law, will have long-term, broad ramifications for Chinese 
society.  Is this mosaic-like system of land ownership and use rights 
capable of ensuring the certainty and predictability essential to real estate 
transfer and development?  Are the institutional arrangements of property 
rights under this system perceived credible by economic players in China?  
Will the sense of ownership enjoyed by a burgeoning urban middle class 
awaken an enhanced feeling of individual autonomy?  Or will it be an 
adhesive unifying the beneficiaries of economic reform and the current 
political regime, thereby perpetuating the unequal distribution of social 
wealth?  Is the law capable of protecting farmers in the impoverished 
countryside, who have long been left behind by the economic reform, from 
losing their farmland to corrupt local officials seeking lucrative land sales?  
Will the central government eventually be pressured to allow full private 
ownership rights over the land?  These issues will be discussed and 
analyzed in Parts III and IV below. 
 
159 Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., The New Chinese Property Law, 21-OCT PROB. & PROP. 16 
(2007).  
160 Id. at 17. 
161 Property Law, supra note 138, art. 149. 
162 Id. 
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III. CAPITALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: THE 
INTERPLAY BETWEEN ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND 
INSTITUTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Observers of China's economic reform and legal reform have been 
quick to point out China's significant departure from the path delineated by 
the neo-liberal theorists of the law and development school, as exemplified 
by those advocated by the Washington Consensus.  The theoretical 
framework for the Washington Consensus mainly consists of the new 
institutional economics ("NIE") influenced by, on the one hand, Ronald 
Coase's "transaction cost economics" and Douglass North's designation of 
law as an "institution," and on the other the "public choice economics" 
which harbors a fundamental distrust of state interference into economic 
affairs.163    The neo-liberal rule of law proposed by the Washington 
Consensus was a response to the needs for systemic reform presented by 
the transitional socialist legal systems in the 1990s.  The Washington 
Consensus views clear and enforceable private property rights as the 
precondition for stable economic development and well-functioning 
markets.  The Washington Consensus also recognizes that the need for 
credibility and commitment within a market economy leads to the 
formation of independent legal institutions.164   
As evidenced by the policies and legal reforms undertaken through 
the reform era set forth in Part II, China's "gradualist approach" differs in 
two aspects from the so-called "big bang" method of privatization followed 
by the former Soviet Union and most former socialist states in Eastern 
Europe.  First, in an attempt to move from a centrally planned economy to 
a market economy, China did not engage in an outright privatization of its 
real property rights.  Second, China's substantial change in economic 
institutions was not accompanied by a simultaneous political 
transformation.165  The impressive economic growth that China has enjoyed 
since the late 1970s seems to defy the need for privatization of land 
ownership.  Under the banner of a "Socialist market economy with Chinese 
characteristics," China seems to have pioneered an alternative model of 
 
163 See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECON. 386 (1937); See also NORTH, supra note 
2, at 6;  John Williamson, From Reform Agenda to Damaged Brand Name: A Short History 
of the Washington Consensus and Suggestions for What to Do Next, FIN. & DEV. 10 (Sept. 
2003).  See generally John K.M. Ohnesorge, Developing Development Theory: Law and 
Development Orthodoxies and the Northeast Asian Experience, 28 U. PENN. J. INT'L ECO. L. 
232 (2007) (explaining why observers are suspicious of government intervention in the 
economy).   
164 See Ohnesorge, supra note 163, at  243–49.   
165 See David L. Weimer, The Political Economy of Property Rights, in THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 1, 1–2 (David L. Weimer ed., Cambridge University Press 
1997). 
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development that ensures long-term economic growth without abandoning 
the principles of state and collective land ownership.166           
Part III of this paper introduces the theoretical framework of the 
credibility of property rights, which functions as the precondition to stable 
economic performance.  Part III then examines whether the particular 
institutional arrangements of property rights in China have achieved 
credibility, and therefore served as the driving force for the economic 
growth despite a lack of outright privatization of ownership rights.  Lastly, 
in pondering the question of whether privatization of land ownership is in 
order for the next stage of China's economic development, Part III 
concludes that the cost of invoking full privatization may outweigh its 
benefits.  Thus, a better course of action is to rectify the current pitfalls of 
the use and management of rural land, and to improve the credibility of the 
use rights over such land.  
A. Credibility of Property Rights   
"Credibility" can be viewed as "a consequence of the stability of 
individual expectations about future government actions to redefine or 
violate relevant property rights."167  Just as the "constituents" in North's 
fable face the dilemma that the "ruler" may at some point renege on his 
promises, property right holders fear that their rights risk being infringed 
upon by the very government who defined their rights.  Therefore, 
credibility of the commitment is the "fundamental question of property 
rights."168  For a reform to be effective in promoting economic growth and 
political stability, property rights must be credible.  This section begins 
with an investigation of the nature of property rights, including an analysis 
of property rights in China, and then examines what makes property rights 
credible.       
1. What are Property Rights? 
 When considering property or property rights, most people, 
including legal professionals, intuitively construe such rights as ownership 
rights, and view property as things that are owned by persons.  This view 
has its historic origin.  William Blackstone famously proclaimed that the 
right of property means "dominion" over things that "one man claims and 
exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the 
 
166 See Ho, supra note 11, at 397. 
167  Daniel Diermeier, Joel M. Ericson, Timothy Frye, & Steven Lewis, Credible 
Commitment and Property Rights: The Role of Strategic Interaction between Political and 
Economic Actors, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 20-22 (David L. 
Weimer ed., Cambridge University Press 1997). 
168 Id. at 20.  
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right of any other individual in the universe,"169 although he later qualified 
his claims of dominion with uncertainties over the origins of title.170  
However, as Charles Donahue, Jr. points out, both a historical review and a 
comparative study easily show the extraordinary diversity in the concept of 
property that has existed in the West as well as in non-Western societies.171  
Such a finding makes it clear that "any concept of property other than the 
definitional one" must be examined within the "culture in which it is 
found."172   
2. Property Rights in the Western Tradition: Common Law View 
vs. Civil Law View 
Let us examine property rights in the common law system first and 
then turn to the civil law system.  In the common law tradition, some 
modern property theorists differentiate themselves from the Blackstonian 
view by dissolving the notion of ownership.173  Wesley Hohfeld analyzes 
the concept of property within the framework of jural relationships that 
consist of the pairing of what he called "the lowest common denominators 
of the law," namely, rights and duties, privileges and no-rights, powers and 
liabilities, immunities and disabilities.174  He points out that as a fee-simple 
owner of Blackacre, A's "'legal interest' or 'property' to the land consists of 
a complex aggregate of rights (or claims), privileges, powers and 
immunities," which include (1) A's multital legal rights, or claims, that 
others shall not enter on the land or cause physical harm to the land; (2) A's 
indefinite number of legal privileges of entering on the land, etc. within the 
confines of law (correlative to A's legal privileges are the respective legal 
no-rights of other persons); (3) A's legal power to alienate his legal interest 
to another (correlative to all such legal powers are the legal liabilities in 
other persons); and (4) A's indefinite number of legal immunities (non-
liability or non-subjection to a power on the part of another person) 
(correlative to the immunities are the respective legal disabilities of other 
 
169 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. 
170 See Carol M. Rose, The Moral Subject of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1897, 1899-
07 (2007).     
171 See Charles Donahue, Jr., The Future of the Concept of Property Predicted from its Past, 
in PROPERTY 30-31 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., New York University 
Press 1980). 
172 Id. at 31. 
173  See Thomas G. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY 78 (J. Roland 
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., New York University Press 1980). 
174 WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, SOME FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN 
JUDICIAL REASONING, reprinted in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 63-64 (Yale 
University Press 1964). 
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persons in general).175  Thus, A's property rights relating to Blackacre lie in 
these various elements.   
Even though Hohfeld's jural relationships approach appears to be 
the first attempt at the articulation of the common law "bundle-of-rights" or 
"bundle-of-sticks" conception of property,176 Donahue believes that the 
Hohfeldian definition of property has universal application due to its 
descriptive nature.177  The Restatement of Property adopts a Hohfeldian 
definition of "property."178  It states that the word "property" is used to 
"denote legal relations between persons with respect to a thing" and that 
"[l]egal relations between persons can be of widely differing types," 
including "relations designated by the words 'right,' 'privilege,' 'power' and 
'immunity.'"179  Therefore, in the common law tradition, the law of property 
"deals with the complexity of those jural relationships with respect to 
things, those things being normally tangible things, although in some legal 
systems, those intangibles that the law somewhat arbitrarily classifies as 
property are also included."180 
Although the relational dimension of the concept of property rights 
can indeed apply to both common law and civil law systems as suggested 
by Donahue, the fragmentation of ownership approach adopted by the 
common law system is certainly not a feature shared by the civil law 
system.  As a general rule, the civil law countries of Europe have followed 
a "unitary theory of property rights" since the nineteenth century, under 
which all property rights in an asset (both movable and non-movable 
properties) must be concentrated in the hands of a single owner rather than 
divided into partial rights shared among two or more persons."181  The 
totality conception of ownership is emphasized in the civil law definition of 
"property."  As Alain Levasseur points out, in the Vocabulaire Juridique of 
Professor Gérard Cornu, the civil law equivalent of Black's Law 
Dictionary, "property," "used by itself, refers to the private ownership – 
individual right of ownership – and the full ownership or the highest level 
of a real right: to use, to enjoy and to dispose[.]"182  Therefore, Article 544 
of the French Civil Code defines "ownership" as "the right to enjoy and 
dispose of things in the most absolute manner, provided they are not used 
 
175  Id. at 96–97. 
176 See Grey, supra note 173, at 78.  
177 See Donahue, supra note 171, at 31. 
178 See Restatement (First) of Property ch. 1, intro. note (1936) 
179 Id. 
180 See Donahue, supra note 171, at 30.  
181  Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The 
Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. (SUPP.) 373, 
375 (2002). 
182 Alain A. Levasseur, The Boundaries of Property Rights: La Notion de Biens, 54 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 145, 146 (2006). 
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in a way prohibited by statutes or regulations[.]"183  Article 947 of the 
Québec Civil Code offers a similar definition with the addition that 
"[o]wnership may be in various modes and dismemberments." 184   In 
describing the "substance of ownership" Article 903 of the German Civil 
Code uses more absolute language and states "[t]he owner of a thing may, 
to the extent that it is not contrary to the law or the rights of third parties, 
deal with the thing as he pleases and exclude others from any 
interference."185 
 Both civil law and common law systems recognize a limited 
number of partial or divided property rights. In the common law system, 
property rights for limited uses of land include, for example, easements, 
real covenants, and equitable servitudes.186  In the civil law system, the 
theory of numerus clausus (closed number) allows a relatively small 
number of specifically defined exceptions to the "unitary theory of property 
rights," and these "incidents of ownership (particularly with regard to real 
property) are grouped into code-defined jura in re aliena (other real 
property rights, including usufruct rights)."187  Civil law jurisdictions also 
impose more rigid restrictions on such rights.188  Permissible exceptions 
include, for example, cotenancy, servitudes on real property, mortgages on 
real property.  And partial property rights that do not conform to one of 
these specific exceptions, such as private trust, are unenforceable.189  On 
the other hand, although the condominium has long been recognized by the 
civil law and widely employed in Europe, it was not accepted into U.S. 
property law until 1961, and English law continues to decline its 
adaptation.190 
 Despite the varying degrees of differences between the two legal 
systems as illustrated above, they share similar philosophical 
underpinnings.  Based on a historical review of the concept of property in 
both the Roman law tradition and English legal system, Donahue finds that 
"one tendency seems to characterize the legal concept of property in the 
definitional sense in the West:  a tendency to agglomerate in a single legal 
person, preferably the one currently possessed of the thing that is the object 
of inquiry, the exclusive right to possess, privilege to use, and power to 
convey the thing."191  Further, he concludes that the "Western legal concept 
 
183 Id. n.6. 
184 Id. ("Ownership is the right to use, enjoy and dispose of property fully and freely, subject 
to the limits and conditions for doing so determined by law"). 
185 Id. 
186 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 181, at 376. 
187 Frank Xianfeng Huang, The Path to Clarity:  Development of Property Rights in China, 
17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 191, 206–08 (2004). 
188 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 181, at 376. 
189 Id. at 375. 
190 Id. at 376–77. 
191 See Donahue, supra note 171, at 32. 
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of property has always been associated with various forms of 
individualism," some of which lie behind the Roman concept of property 
and others the emergence of property in English law. 192  Although 
individualism is only one side of a dichotomy, namely individualism versus 
communalism, the concept of property in the West has normally been 
associated with the former only.193   He urges that, given the tension 
between both sides of the dichotomy, i.e., the individual and society, self-
protection and self-giving, the legal system must resolve the tension 
between them.194   
3. Locating China's Property Rights 
 A review of China's property rights systems, described in Part II, 
against the theoretical framework of the Western conception of property 
rights, summarized in Subpart A.1.a of Part III above, reveals that the 
current property rights regime in the PRC is a unique product of two main 
factors: (i) China's conscious, voluntarily or coerced, effort starting from 
the end of the imperial era, to internationalize its overall legal system and 
(ii) China’s recognition of its potent indigenous legal culture shaped by 
path dependence.  In other words, China’s property rights regime features a 
collectivist legal order based on Confucianism, as influenced by continental 
civil law system with an infusion of Marxist-Leninist ideology.  As Potter 
observes, the development of property rights in the PRC is a process of 
mediating the conflicts between the individualist orientation of liberal 
property rights regimes and the collectivist norms of Chinese tradition and 
PRC policy. 195   He further points out that, "[t]he patrimonialism of 
Confucianized Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought combines with 
the sovereignty of party-state supremacy to establish a powerful modality 
of governance in the PRC."196  If indeed that was the end that the party-state 
tries to achieve, then the means to accomplish that end is to import legal 
forms from Europe, the former Soviet Union, and increasingly from North 
America, through a process called "selective adaptation."197  
 The authoritarian and hierarchical principles of Confucianism, 
which are deeply embedded in Chinese culture, dictated that the interests of 
the individual should be subordinate to those of the collective.198 The 
collective was represented by community organizations, such as clans, 
 
192 Id. at 58. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 See POTTER, supra note 34, at 56. 
196 Pitman B. Potter, Legal Reform in China: Institutions, Culture, and Selective Adaptation, 
29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 477 (2004)l 
197Id. at 476–81. 
198 See POTTER, supra note 34, at 61–62. 
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guilds, and governments.199  Despite the existence of private property rights 
described in Part II, the predominant feature of the property rights regime 
in dynastic China was its collective tradition,200 which remains strong in 
present day China.  Notwithstanding the prevalent cultural influence, the 
property rights regime of the PRC is distinctively molded by transplanted 
civil law influences.  The renowned Chinese jurist Shen Jiaben was 
designated by Guangxu Emperor to supervise the drafting of a new civil 
code, which was completed in 1911 but never officially promulgated due to 
the collapse of the Qing Dynasty later that year.201  The draft Civil Code of 
the Qing Dynasty (大清民律草案), which was modeled after the German 
Civil Code and the Japanese Civil Code, in turn influenced the Civil Code 
of the KMT government.202  Efforts to transplant legal institutions from the 
West, mainly European countries, and Japan continued by the KMT 
government without much success, as such attempts were inconsistent, 
hasty and mechanical.203  
 Upon the CCP's takeover in 1949, China adopted a Soviet style 
"command economy," featuring state and collective ownership of land and 
other means of production, which was later abandoned in the late 1950s.204  
In the civil law arena, the conception of ownership in the PRC has been 
overwhelmingly influenced by Soviet civil law jurisprudence.205  Unlike the 
European civil law tradition described above, the Soviet system gave 
greater preference to the unitary nature and totality conception of 
ownership.206  As Frank Huang observes, ownership under this system "was 
understood as an indivisible and absolute whole and jura in re aliena was 
not provided for."207  As reflected in the 1954 Constitution, all means of 
production were publicly owned and centrally managed.   
The economic reform and the accompanying legal reform begun in 
late 1970s saw China's efforts to interpret and justify newly created 
individual interests brought about by the decollectivization of property 
rights and the creation of new individual property interests based on the old 
narrow conception of ownership.208  It has been a challenging task to create 
and maximize economic incentives to enhance institutional efficiency and 
productivity without challenging the supremacy of party-state and the 
public ownership.  It was not until the early 1980s after the introduction of 
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HRS that the Chinese legislature and legal scholars began formulating a 
consistent and comprehensive real property rights theoretical framework.  
Even then it was largely to justify and then codify what had been practiced 
on the ground.   
One of the central agendas of this task was to develop ownership 
theories to formalize and streamline the decentralized lesser interests.  Save 
those rare instances where common law concepts, such as the doctrine of 
"estate," were borrowed, the dominant view among legal scholars was to 
use the civil law jurisprudential framework, as they were convinced that 
"the Pandectist system of 'real property rights' (物权) is more appealing 
because of its legal specificity, uniformity and publicity."209  The elaborate 
use of the concept of "other real property rights" (他物权), particularly 
"usufruct" (用益物权) is of critical importance in "propertizing" the 
decentralized lesser interests, such as the "land use right" of state-owned, 
mostly urban, lands, the "contractual management right" of collectively 
owned rural lands, the "enterprise management right" of SOEs, and "profits 
a prendre" of state-owned natural resources.210   
Much of the legal scholarship leading up to and concurrent with the 
drafting and implementation of the Property Law was about usufructuary 
rights.211  For example, Fang Shaokun traces the historical origin of this 
term to ancient Roman law, which consisted of diyi quan (地役权), renyi 
quan (人役权), yongdian quan (永佃权) and dishang quan (地上权).212  
He believes the concept of usufructuary rights contained both in the French 
Civil Code and the German Civil Code was influenced by the ancient 
Roman law.213  In an effort to prove that this concept was an integral part of 
China's legal tradition, he notes that the practical contents of usufruct 
existed in traditional China's dianquan (典权) system, such as diyi quan, 
yongdian quan and dishang quan, even though no specific statutory 
sections were singled out for this type of rights.214  Further, he observes that 
usufructuary rights were classified into four categories, dishang quan, 
yongdian quan, diyi quan and dianquan in the Second Draft of Civil Code 
of Qing Dynasty (第二次民律草案), which classification was adopted by 
the civil law principles of the PRC.215 
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One of the lesser ideologically driven debates surrounding the draft 
Property Law concerns whether to treat the rural land contracted 
management rights as a species of contract rights or usufructuary rights.216  
To better protect the interests of individual lessee villagers, stabilize the 
economic relationship between the collective owners and individual users, 
and enhance the transferability of the right, the Property Law adopted the 
usufruct approach.217 
4.     What Makes Property Rights Credible? 
 North tells the story of the "wealth maximizing absolute ruler" to 
illustrate what makes a commitment credible.218  He offers two kinds of 
credible commitments: 
The ruler may be able to structure the game so that it is 
both in his and his constituents' interest to abide by the 
rules -- motivational credibility.  Or the ruler may find that 
further wealth accumulation can only be realized by 
binding himself irreversibly (such as giving over rights and 
coercive power to constituents or their representatives) -- 
imperative credibility.219   
 
He further elaborates that,  
[a] commitment is motivationally credible if the players 
continue to want to honor the commitment at the time of 
performance.  In this case it is incentive compatible and 
hence self-enforcing.  It is credible in the imperative sense 
if the player cannot act otherwise because performance is 
coerced or discretion is disabled.220 
 
Subsequent law and development theorists, including those who 
influenced the Washington Consensus, have focused on the "imperative 
credibility" option, which deems a commitment credible only if such 
commitment devices compel actors to abide by a set of rules because a 
violation of such would have been too costly.  Since "[i]nstitutions are the 
rules of the game"221 and since legal systems are institutions,222 under the 
"liberal democratic" development model they espoused, competitive 
markets, free individuals, and civil and political liberties protected by "the 
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rule of law" are critical preconditions to stable economic growth.223  Central 
to this liberal democratic understanding is the privatization of property 
rights, especially as applied to the formerly socialist economies.  As 
prescribed by Cheryl Gray, those economies must establish the institutions 
of private market economy because “[s]ocialism either crippled or 
reoriented these institutions to reflect the goals of central planners” and, as 
a result, “[l]egal frameworks defining property rights, private contract 
regimes . . . atrophied.”224 
 The popularity and widespread application of the policies 
advocated by the Washington Consensus at that time largely overshadowed 
North's motivational credibility option, which focuses on credibility 
achieved through self-enforcing, not compelled, institutional constraints.  
Under this option, credibility is self-enforced if players are incentivized to 
honor the commitment at the time of their performance.  Unlike orthodox 
law and development theory, this analysis no longer simply insists that 
privatization is the precondition to development, because the key inquiry is 
shifted to whether the underlying institutional arrangements, including 
property rights, can achieve sustained credibility by creating sufficient 
incentives.  
 Propelled by sufficient incentives created by strategic interaction or 
bargaining among political and economic actors, credible commitment to 
property rights emerges as an equilibrium; and in equilibrium, the behavior 
of political and economic agents is self-enforcing.225  In other words, 
property rights "are respected only if the relevant agents cannot improve 
their payoff by violating them."226  In a "dictatorial decision making" 
setting, Daniel Diermeier et al. observe, the credibility of the property 
rights depends on the strategic incentives facing the actors, for the 
government it is the probability of its political survival, i.e., the likelihood 
that the government will not be overthrown, and for the "producer" the 
"equilibrium tax rate," under which his gains will not be expropriated by 
the government with higher than expected "tax rates."227  It follows that 
property rights are credible only if the expected benefits for the government 
are high enough to make it worthwhile to forgo expropriation and if all 
actors are able to observe a defection by the government.  For there to be 
an investment equilibrium, a partial or "noisy" observability of defections 
will suffice.228  
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 By contrast, Diermeier et al. apply the same economic analysis to a 
"stylized majority rule decision making" model under which the decision 
makers come from different demographics and are driven by varied 
incentives when voting for a tax rate.229  Diermeier et al. find that, by 
reducing the influence of any individual political actor somewhat, the 
credibility of property rights could be increased because the cost of 
changing the "tax rate" increases.  In other words, since decisions are made 
by a majority through a democratic process, the incentive on the part of the 
government to deviate will be decreased; as a result, property rights will be 
more secure under this model than the dictatorial decision making model.230  
Applying the same analysis to a "federalistic decision making" setting, 
where authority and responsibility are allocated among different levels of a 
hierarchy of autonomous governments, and to a "interest group decision 
making" setting, Diermeier et al. conclude that, "[t]his logic suggests a 
testable hypothesis:  Other things being equal, governments with dispersed 
political power are better able to make a credible commitment to property 
rights than are governments with more concentrated power."231   
B.  Are Property Rights in China Credible? 
 The legislative process in the area of real property law reflects the 
general development approach adopted by the party-state elsewhere in the 
reform, i.e., incremental transition rather than radical reform.  Instead of 
abandoning altogether the state and collective ownership of land and opting 
for outright privatization, China utilized innovative lesser real property 
interests, such as the "right to contracted management of land" in the 
countryside and "construction land use right" in cities, which essentially 
combined centralized ownership with decentralized use and management 
rights.  By doing so, China was able to establish a preliminary legal 
framework in this area which functioned to stimulate growth in the rural 
areas and real estate development in the urban areas.   
 But are property rights offered by the current system credible?  As 
observed by Diermeier et al., in a system where decisions are made by a 
single actor, credibility of the property rights does not mean perfect 
security, rather it rests on whether the commitment is capable of creating 
sufficient incentives on both the government and the economic actors.  In 
other words, whether an observability of the government's defections has 
induced sufficient incentive on the part of the government to honor its 
commitment and whether such commitment is perceived by the economic 
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actors to be sufficiently secure in order to create an incentive for them to 
continue to invest.   
 Despite the lack of land tenure security, clarity or uniformity in 
enforcement, the system has achieved "motivational credibility," to borrow 
from North.  This is accomplished by creating sufficient incentives in the 
minds of China's economic actors, namely the farmers in rural areas and 
real property investors and the general public in the cities with regard to 
both commercial and residential real properties.  There exists an incentive 
on the part of the party-state to honor its decentralization commitment in 
the real property law regime, arising from an observability by both the 
party-state and the general public of a defection, i.e., the vanishing 
legitimacy of the one-party rule resulted primarily from the gross mis-
management by the party both economically and politically since the 
founding of the PRC.  An incentive on the part of economic actors, on the 
other hand, is created because they deem the commitment by the party-state 
credible.   
1. Political Vulnerability of the Party-State 
 The disadvantaged, disenfranchised and the self-enlightened, in 
spite of the government's suppression, managed to make their discontents 
heard through political disobedience, such as the Tian'anmen student 
movement in 1989 and the surging activism recently seen in land related 
grievances.232  Deng's suppression of the Tian'anmen student movement 
notwithstanding, the process of marketization resumed two years later.  
Further, as mentioned in Part I above, the determination to push forward 
for a system of Socialist market economy was reaffirmed in 1992.233  As 
indicated in a television speech Deng gave in the immediate aftermath of 
Tian'anmen, he called the political "turmoil" inevitable and said that "it was 
[] independent of all human will."234  In the same speech, he stated that the 
reform policies "ought to stand."235  It had become clear to Deng that 
reform was not only inevitable but also the only salvation for the party-
state's political survival.  As Robert Weatherley observes, "[u]nable to 
reconcile its Marxist ideology with the increasingly active role of the 
market and unwilling to wholeheartedly embrace institutional and other 
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political reforms, the party looked more and more to the economy as a 
means of shoring up its popular appeal."236  
 Similarly, the process China took to draft and enact its Property 
Law demonstrates the party-state's acute awareness of its political 
vulnerability as exposed by the surging social activism and unrests relating 
to land grievances.  It is reported that rural land grievances have become 
the major source of unrest in China237 and that "property rights have 
displaced tax burdens as the primary focus of peasant activism."238  The 
unprecedented move for the NPC to seek public consultation on the draft 
Property Law was propelled by its desire to test the public's expectations 
about how much commitment from the party-state would make the rights 
credible.  The public consultation process, which involved seven drafts 
over a period of thirteen years, is a vivid illustration of the bargaining 
process between political and economic actors in achieving what North and 
Diermeier et al. called an equilibrium, i.e., self-enforcing credibility 
through motivation.239  
2. Decentralization and Deliberate Non-Interference 
 Conversely, the commitment by the party-state to decentralize 
property rights has created sufficient incentives for farmers and city 
dwellers alike, both developers and residents, to invest in the lesser real 
property interests.  Much of the literature on China's legal system and legal 
reform has pointed to considerable deficiencies, including ambiguity, lack 
of clearly defined property rights and weak enforcement, and concluded 
that China has not achieved "rule of law."240  Granted such may be the case, 
but it was the same indeterminacy and institutional ambiguity that created 
the incentives desperately needed to improve productivity which was 
previously lacking for an economy to emerge from a centrally planned 
model.  As Peter Ho remarks, "this 'deliberate institutional ambiguity' 
makes the system tick."241  Although, given the muddling-through and "trial 
and error" characteristics of Deng's reform trajectory, Ho himself has 
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qualified that the "deliberate" nature of the institutional ambiguity, the lack 
of clearly defined property rights has indeed "provided flexibility and 
fluidity that were needed for increasing productivity of the land." 242 
 To increase productivity through incentives was clearly a goal 
Deng had in mind when he announced "let some people get rich first" in 
1978 and launched the HRS shortly after.  At the heart of Deng's legacy is 
his unleashing of the largest labor force in the world by "allow[ing] 
economic (but not political) developments to unfold without constant 
interference from the Party or government."243  In other words, "he has 
displayed a personal talent for laissez-faire:  he has mastered the ruler's art 
of non-acting." 244  The trademark feature of a centrally-planned economy is 
the party-state's omnipresence at all levels of the economic structure.  By 
adopting a non-interference strategy, de facto deregulation became the key 
to effecting the decollectivization and decentralization policy, which was 
primarily responsible for HRS's resounding success in rural China. 
 If credibility is initially created by incentives, it is sustained by 
trust.  While articulateness can help build trust, trust may also be induced 
by vagueness.  When commenting on someone's work, Ronald Coase once 
remarked: "Not being clear, it was never clearly wrong."245  In other words, 
"[a]n idea which is not clearly stated can never be proved clearly wrong[,]" 
since the advantage of vagueness is its ability to elude challenge.246  Some 
argue that vagueness and ambiguity in the policies and laws of the PRC 
may have helped the CCP in evading ideological challenges from its 
supporters and non-supporters alike, at least during the initial phase of the 
reform.  Peter Ho observes that, since property rights, especially ownership 
of such rights, touch upon the very foundations of the PRC, it is crucial for 
the party-state to strike the right balance between ideology and socio-
economic reality, in order to avoid social conflict.247  Therefore, land 
policy-making is "an alternation of restraining practices that exceed legal 
boundaries and giving space to experimentation by formulating 
intentionally unclear policies and laws."248  He further observes, "[t]he 
ambiguity results in a lot of confusion about the officially condoned land 
property arrangements," but at the same time, it "allows a certain degree of 
[local] experimentation."249         
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Barry Weignast argues that China's reform policies had 
inadvertently created what he called a system of "self-enforcing market-
preserving federalism."250  According to Weignast, the pragmatic approach 
to the reform resulted in the decentralization of powers, including fiscal 
authority.  Such decentralization not only created incentives among local 
governments for "preserving their newfound power, but [also] gave them 
the fiscal resources and muscle to resist efforts by the central government 
to undo the system." 251  In Peter Ho's view, the institutional ambiguity, as 
supported by the party-state, has "not only served as the lubricant of a well-
oiled machine, but also prevented the large-scale eruption of land-related 
grievances over ownership that ruptured transitional economies such as in 
former socialist states in East Europe."252    
 In analyzing economic history through an institutional framework, 
North warns that the powerful influence of the past on the present and 
future should not be neglected.  As he points out, "[l]earning of history [] is 
an incremental process filtered by the culture of a society that determines 
the perceived payoffs[.]" 253  The political turmoil and extreme volatility of 
organized social unrest such as the Great Leap Forward and Cultural 
Revolution during the Mao era had rendered a very low threshold for what 
could be credible in measuring the expectations of the general public.  The 
structure of the centrally planned economy had by that time virtually 
destroyed any incentive to improve productivity before the reform policy 
was introduced.  Against this historical backdrop, the relative social 
stability of the Deng era and its decentralization measures are highly 
conducive to creating strong incentives for the public.  Conceivably, 
credibility on the part of the economic actors was achieved with little 
difficulty.  By achieving motivational credibility, property rights 
arrangements in China during the reform era, however vague, 
indeterminate or ambiguous, had fostered the nation's stellar economic 
performance, while defying the policy guidelines proposed by the neo-
liberal economic theorists.  In praising the incremental approach taken by 
the Chinese government, Joseph Stiglitz remarks that: "The ultimate irony 
is that many of the countries that have taken a more gradualist policy have 
succeeded in making deeper reforms more rapidly." 254      
 
250  Barry R. Weingast, The Political Commitment to Market and Marketization, THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 43, 46 (David L. Weimer ed., 1997). 
251 Id. at 47. 
252 HO, supra note 156, at 188. 
253  Douglass C. North, Epilogue: Economic Performance through Time, in EMPIRICAL 
STUDIES IN INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 342, 349 (Lee J. Alston, Thrainn Eggertsson and 
Douglass C. North eds. 1996).  
254 See STIGLITZ, supra note 7, at 185. 
84 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW                [Vol. 6 
 
C. Legal Reform with Chinese Characteristics 
 As shown by China's recent legislation in the area of real property 
rights, although it falls short in setting forth clearly defined ownership 
rights, especially in the rural areas, and providing concrete enforcement 
procedures, the Property Law nevertheless proves efficient.  China's 
experience in this area may have validated Richard Posner's view that "the 
focus of [legal] reform [of poor countries] should be on creating 
substantive and procedurally efficient rules of contract and property rather 
than on creating a first-class judiciary[.]"255  A major rationale, according to 
Posner, is that a poor country may benefit from making modest initial 
expenditures on law reform, aimed to improve its rules of contract and 
property, as a tradeoff because a small expenditure on law reform can 
increase the rate of economic growth.256  Once the rate of economic growth 
is increased and resources are generated, it will enable such country to 
undertake more ambitious legal reforms in the future.257  Further, informal 
substitutes for the formal legal system not only are less expensive but also 
play a significant role in the enforcement and protection of property and 
contract rights.258  Among the informal substitutes that Posner identifies, 
the following prove particularly effective:  Arbitration (with or without 
legal enforcement of the arbitrator's award), reputation (which may be 
accompanied by retaliation), and altruism (which enables many family-
owned firms to operate effectively outside a legal framework).259   In 
Posner's view, China proves and embodies his theory.  
 Donald Clarke et al. echo Posner's view, albeit with less 
conviction.  Based on an examination of the relationship between law, 
institutions, and property rights in post-Mao China, Clarke et al. conclude 
that "the Chinese experience may show support for a theory that 
development induces law."260  They begin their analysis by positing the so-
called "China Conundrum" - the seeming contradiction between the China 
experience and the Rights Hypothesis, which accords importance to a well-
functioning legal system.261  After applying several theories, Clarke et al. 
find that, "while contract institutions do affect some things[,] it is property 
rights institutions that matter for investment and long-run economic 
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growth."262  They conclude that, "the various shortcomings of China's legal 
institutions insofar as they protect contract rights [vis-à-vis property rights] 
may not matter very much, provided that the political structure in a 
sufficient number of places provides a reasonable degree of certainty to 
investors, both pubic and private."263  
 The CCP's conscious effort to maintain the legitimacy of its regime 
has unconsciously stricken a chord with the belief held by Posner, as 
discussed immediately above, and North, as stated elsewhere in this paper, 
that informal institutions play a significant role in shaping the overall 
institutional change and thereby impact economic performance.  
Commenting on the importance of political commitment, Posner notes: 
It should be obvious that effective legal reform depends 
ultimately on a political will to reform, which in turn is 
likely to depend on a political will to implement economic 
reform.  If the dominant political groups in society want 
economic prosperity and are willing to risk the loss of 
political control over the economy that modern economic 
conditions dictate, they will also want legal reform.  If they 
do not want economic reform, the will to adopt legal 
reform is likely to be absent.264 
While it is true, as illustrated in Subpart III.B above, formal 
institutional changes aimed at decentralization have been critical in 
obtaining credibility of new property forms in the reform era, changes in 
informal institutions have played a significant role in providing the 
guarantee of nonintervention.265   
 One of the considerably more powerful, albeit informal, 
institutions in the PRC is party policies of the CCP.  As Yuanyuan Shen 
points out, the CCP policy certainly enjoyed supremacy before  Deng's 
reform, due to the doctrine that "Party policy is the soul of socialist law."266  
The early phase of the law reform starting from the late 1970s, signaled the 
CCP's attempt to establish the authority of law. 267  However, despite legal 
and political efforts at the time, "[i]n both theory and reality, [] it is 
impossible to have a comprehensive and institutionalized legal system with 
a high degree of authority when law is neither 'autonomous' nor 'supreme,' 
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but used only as an instrument of [p]arty rule." 268  As Alford observes, this 
instrumentality was reflected in "the willingness of states or individuals to 
use legality as an instrument to achieve their policy objectives but to depart 
from it when compliance with the law no longer serves the attainment of 
such ends."269  For this reason, the ambiguity and vagueness in formal legal 
institutions made it possible for the party-state to adeptly maneuver from 
legality to party policy to respond to the emerging interests and rising 
needs that resulted from unpredictable social changes.  As demonstrated in 
Subpart III.B above, this responsiveness not only stimulated economic 
growth by creating incentives, but also enabled CCP to weather political 
unrests time and again despite its political vulnerability, and helped it 
maintain its political monopoly, a paramount order of the day.   
 However, the ever increasing complexity of the market economy 
compels the CCP to further advance its legal reform.  The more in-depth 
the legal reform progresses, the greater the CCP risks losing its political 
control over the economy.  It is at this juncture that the regime's legitimacy 
begins to morph from an ideological legitimacy to one that is based on 
economic performance.  
  During the stage of metamorphosis, law remains more or less an 
instrumentality.  Central to the success of Posner's model illustrated above 
is the so-called "rules-first strategy".  In his view, China has followed this 
approach by "introducing modern, commercially oriented rules of law at 
the same time that it liberalized the economy."270  His observation is valid.  
China has seemingly pursued and succeeded in striking a balance between 
transplanting international legal institutions and maintaining the law's 
indigenous roots, at least for the current phase of the property rights legal 
reform.271  Resistance against the "wholesale transplantation" approach in 
China's legal reform was born out of the CCP's imperative to maintain its 
legitimacy.  It was a desire shared by many jurists in China, perhaps largely 
influenced by, and intended to defend, the party policy but nonetheless 
genuine, to indigenize the legal reform.  The incremental nature of the 
property rights legislation proved that "the guiding principles for legal 
reform are instrumentalism, utilitarianism and authoritarianism as 
underlying philosophies in building a new legal system which regards 
maintenance of political regime as being the main goal of legal reform. . . ." 
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270 Posner, supra note 255, at 4. 
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272  At the same time, it reflected a belief among jurists as represented by 
Zhu Suli that "in China's pursuit of the rule of law, the key is not to copy 
the Western legal system, but rather is to pay attention to the functioning, 
through customs, of China's society." 273  He urges that "[f]ocus should be 
directed towards social institutions that have been proven by experience to 
be useful[,]" because "[o]therwise, the formal legal system could be 
ignored and made irrelevant, possibly doing great harm to social order and 
culture."274  This view is echoed by Daniel Bromley, who asserts that 
"[h]istory plays a role here for the simple reason that any social 
commitment is necessarily informed by prevailing ethical norms[, and] 
within those prevailing social commitments, each generation brings its own 
imperatives for continuity and change[.]"275 
 China's legal recognition and formalization of lesser real property 
interests in property rights as codified by the Property Law gave rise to 
disintegration and fragmentation of property rights.  When "the single-
owner presupposition is dropped," the difference between organizing an 
economy according to capitalism or socialism becomes less plausible.276  
As such, Thomas Grey notes, "capitalism and socialism become, not 
mutually exclusive forms of social organization, but tendencies that can be 
blended in various proportions," although "differences between profit-
oriented market exchange and political collective decision as methods of 
organizing and operating enterprises remain."277  The blending of both 
socialism and capitalism elements of the economic order, coupled with a 
Confucianized Communist ideology, might be at the core of what it means 
to be "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics." 
D. Is Privatization in Order?     
 The reaffirmation of state and public land ownership by the CCP in 
its Property Law was more than a product of compromise resulting from 
fierce political debates about ideology and redistribution of social wealth 
accumulated through the reform era.  It was a political stance taken by the 
party-state.  While the decentralization and recognition of the multiplicity 
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of forms of property rights had proved to be highly effective in stimulating 
China's economic growth, such institutional arrangements did little to 
resolve pre-existing jurisprudential and technical conflicts in the area of 
land ownership.  Rather, it highlighted the role property rights play in 
wealth distribution.  As noted by Milton Friedman, "the final distribution of 
income and wealth [] may well depend[] markedly on the rules of property 
adopted."278  Consequently, "the privatization of ownership [] remains one 
of the most explosive issues in Chinese society," particularly in rural 
China.279 
1. Land Related Grievances 
 Decades of double-digit growth, booming development in urban 
centers, and soaring government revenues would have been causes for 
celebration for any other country, but ironically the CCP has much to worry 
about.  And property rights are at the root of the problem.  Some have 
predicated that China has two revolutions waiting to happen: "One is the 
bourgeois revolution led by the emerging property-owning middle class 
that the [Property Law] will help.  The other is the potential for the 
simmering resentment in the countryside to boil over, perhaps in frustration 
at the law's shortcomings."280  This may not be a false alarm, considering 
the fact that land related grievances have become the primary source for 
social unrest in today's China. 
a. Rural Areas 
 When Deng proclaimed "let some people get rich first" at the 
outset of what was to become an unstoppable, jaw-dropping economic 
transformation, it was anyone's guess whether he had foreseen the huge and 
ever-growing income disparity between the rural populace and the city 
dwellers.  Despite China's impressive industrialization in recent decades, it 
remains an agrarian nation, as two-thirds of its population are still 
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farmers.281  Most of China's 700 million plus rural population are left 
behind by the economic reform.  It is reported that the average urban-rural 
income disparity had reached a record 3.34:1 in the first half of 2007.282    
 The Property Law did little to improve farmers' land use rights, as 
it neither imposed new limitations on the governments' powers to 
appropriate land—a rampant practice whereby local governments would 
seize land for non-agricultural uses or for lucrative resale as the industrial 
economy expands—nor allowed farmland mortgages.283  The constitution 
mandates that collectives own the rural land without clearly defining who 
the collectives are.  Since the Property Law does not clarify the actual 
ownership of the rural land, increasingly, local township and village heads 
acted as the de facto owners and sold the land for industrial or commercial 
purposes as urbanization invaded the countryside.284  Additionally, due to 
the high demand and the resulting high prices of the urban land, city 
residents have bought lands from farmers who, without prior authorization, 
sold their lands to developers.285  As many as one out of five homes 
purchased in Beijing is on unauthorized rural land.286  In January 2008, the 
central government had to issue a directive to reiterate to the city residents 
that they were banned from buying village properties.287  Since officials 
from various levels of the local government often illegally seize and 
reallocate farmers' land, farmers are discouraged from making long-term 
investments or engaging in any meaningful land transactions. 288 
 Unsurprisingly, as Xiaolin Guo points out, land expropriation has 
been  primarily responsible for the "proliferation of rural conflicts" in 
China in the past decade.289  Since the Property Law did little to stop the 
practice, it persisted.  Land expropriation is a form of "government 
behavior (政府行为)" which is described as "using coercive measures to 
acquire private land under compensatory arrangement by the government in 
the public interest."290  It is a two-level "government behavior" under the 
law.  Even though the law provides that rural land is owned by the village 
collectives, such collectives have the right to manage (经营) and supervise 
(管理) the use of land, but they have no right to transfer land for 
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compensatory use.291   The power to expropriate land is reserved for the 
state, who "may, in accordance with the law, expropriate land which is 
under collective ownership, if it is in the public interest."292  Under this 
structure, land development involves a two-step process:  Land 
expropriation (土地征用) by the government from villages, and land 
transactions (土地出让) between the government and potential users.293  
Only the second step requires that a transfer of the users' right be priced 
according to market value.294  Guo observes that "land expropriation is, in a 
sense, a procedure by which all rights formerly held by the village 
collective are relinquished to the local government."295  
 His study reveals that the institutional relations between local 
governments (county and township) and village collectives not only jointly 
contributed to but also facilitated land expropriation.296  He observes that 
the "bifurcation of the state perceived by the villagers[] wherein the central 
state stands for justice and the local stands for injustice is significant to an 
understanding of the complexity of state-peasant relations in China."297  He 
attributes the "image of the bifurcated state" to "the increasingly predatory 
behavior" of local state officials.298     
 Mao Zedong repeatedly warned his fellow party members about 
how poverty gave rise to peasants' desire for change and how powerful 
desire for change could in turn push them to revolution.299  Chinese farmers 
have played an instrumental role in bringing the nation to prosperity.  In 
return, they have not only been unfairly neglected when it comes to wealth 
distribution, but also have been asked to bear the brunt of the social costs 
resulting from China's urbanization and industrialization.  Though reasons 
for their plight range far beyond land ownership alone,300 the land issue 
remains at the core and has emerged as the key to finding a solution.  The 
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b. Urban Areas 
 Since the late 1990s, China's urban landscape has undergone a 
rapid transformation because of its sweeping housing privatization.301  
Pressured by the urban residents' desire to protect their newly acquired 
assets, the CCP did much to please the emerging house-owning middle 
class by making their properties more secure through the Property Law.302  
However, the increasing dissatisfaction among urban dwellers caused by 
grievances in the chai qian (拆迁) (demolition and relocation) process 
remains a major concern of the party-state.   
 According to Michael Stanczyk, the decentralization of land 
management and land use control led to vicious competition among local 
governments to attract private real property investments in order to increase 
their local revenues as well as grow the economic clout and political power 
of their locality.303  This thirst for investment by local governments has 
given rise to huge displacements of residential communities across 
China. 304   As observed by You-tien Hsing, this process is further 
complicated by the competition for control over land and, at times, a 
necessary coalition between two dominant sets of statist players—the 
territorial local governments and their leaders on the one hand, and the so-
called "socialist land masters" on the other.305  The second set of players 
come from China's centrally planned economy legacy, where central-level 
government, party and military units, and SOEs that are physically located 
within the jurisdiction of municipal governments formed a vertical 
administrative bureaucratic structure known as tiao-kuai.306  Hsing finds, in 
the struggle against the socialist land masters over control of premium 
urban land, the municipal governments adopt numerous strategies to 
consolidate and reinforce their power, which include setting up new 
government agencies to rationalize land management, embarking on urban 
redevelopment projects in the name of modernization, and establishing 
institutions such as land banks in an attempt to monopolize urban land 
supplies.307  The socialist land masters, on the other hand, capitalize on 
transactions of urban land use rights by forming their own land 
development companies and trading the use rights by negotiation, tender or 
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open auction.308  As the war for dominance over urban land proceeds 
between these two sets of players, ordinary city residents are the ones who 
lose out.     
 On a procedural level, the method of auctioning land use rights by 
the local governments is often flawed, as the bidding process allows both 
formal written rules and informal practice.309  Take Shanghai for instance.  
Since its municipal government is not required to select the highest bidder, 
the process is susceptible to favoritism and corruption.310   In fact, many 
local governments tend to grant real estate developers "sweetheart" deals, 
forming what can be viewed essentially as a loose partnership.311  Often, 
when a collective or individual does not want to deal with a real estate 
developer directly, the developer would "hire" the local government to take 
the land for a "public use."312  Under the law, the local governments not 
only have the power to define what a "public purpose" is, but also decide 
the amount of compensation necessary for the taking.313  As Stanczyk 
observes, the cooperation between the real estate developers and the local 
governments has caused mounting violations of zoning and building codes 
by the developers and has turned inner-city redevelopment into a process of 
"speculation, private deals and corruption."314   
 From a due process protection perspective, the current law lacks 
necessary procedural requirements to protect the residents who are in the 
midst of a demolition and relocation process.  The law does not require 
judicial review, and no injunction is available for those who object to a 
taking.315  Although the issue of compensation may be litigated, practically 
speaking, since local courts are subsidiaries of the government, little help is 
available.316  As illustrated by the high-profile Chongqing "nail house" case 
in March 2007, most disputes arise from what residents perceive as 
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mistreatment by developers, which range from lack of adequate 
compensation to a highly demoralizing and disrespectful process.317   
 For those reasons, demolition of homes for fast-paced urban 
expansion and building development has become a highly contentious issue 
and a leading cause for urban unrest.318  Since 2002, many large cities in 
China have seen a sharp increase of the amount of litigation over unjust and 
unlawful relocations as well as self-organized protests. 319  It is reported that 
the number of protests by displaced citizens has been steadily increasing 
and, in two extreme cases, people set themselves on fire in protest against 
the government's demolition of their homes.320  To palliate widespread, 
escalating social discontent, in January 2011, the State Council 
promulgated the Rules for Expropriation and Compensation for Properties 
on State-owned Land to replace a ten-year old set of rules governing the 
expropriation of urban properties.  The new Rules aim to offer a better 
understanding of what may constitute "public interests" and the types of 
compensations recoverable, in addition to providing stronger procedural 
protections for the property owners.321      
2. The Call for Privatization of Land Ownership  
 As evidenced by the intense political struggle and fierce debate 
through the drafting process of the Property Law, the issue of whether 
China should adopt a policy of outright privatization of land was a highly 
sensitive political and ideological one.  In the end, the drafters chose to 
reaffirm the state and collective ownership of the land, despite prior, 
popular speculations about a greater level of privatization.  However, the 
call for privatization of land ownership persisted. 
 Barely two months after the law was passed, about 1,000 farmers 
gathered in the village meeting hall in Changchunling in Heilongjiang 
Province and took back and redistributed the ownership of land originally 
owned by the village collective to each family.322  Elsewhere in Fujin City, 
where the village is located, more than 70 villages tried to privatize their 
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land within a month.323  Through an internet statement issued in the name 
of Fujin villages, they denounced collective land ownership as a means to 
deprive the farmers of land ownership and declared, "[o]ur farmers' land 
rights should include the right to use the land, the right to make income 
from it, the right to inherit it and dispose of it and the right to negotiate 
over it and set the price of it with developers."324  Within a few weeks, the 
movement quickly spread to regions such as Jiangsu and Shaanxi 
provinces, Tianjin city and as far as Chengdu in Sichuan.325  Although the 
so-called "Fujin privatization movement" mainly grew out of farmers' 
desperate frustration with illegal expropriation of farmland by corrupt local 
officials and land developers, it was viewed by the government as a rural 
revolt and was quickly put down.326   
 Chinese farmers are not alone in advocating for land privatization.  
Legal and political analysts in China's academia have also urged rural land 
privatization.  Some believe it would be the final move toward China's 
agricultural modernization.327  Others view it as a must for redressing the 
economic disparity between China's booming cities and impoverished 
countryside.328  At the very least, there seems to be a consensus that 
"[p]ublic ownership of land in the countryside has become a breeding 
ground for corruption, waste and environmental degradation," which, if left 
unsolved, will threaten social stability. 329   
3. A Theoretical Outlook 
 In discussing how non-revolutionary institutional changes might 
take place, North notes the following: "The agent of change is the 
individual entrepreneur responding to the incentives embodied in the 
institutional framework.  The sources of change are changing relative 
prices [which alter the incentives of individuals in human interaction] or 
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preferences.  The process of change is overwhelmingly an incremental 
one."330  When relative price changes achieve "institutional equilibrium," 
then an institutional change will follow.  "Institutional equilibrium" is 
achieved when "given the bargaining strength of the players and the set of 
contractual bargains that made up total economic exchange, none of the 
players would find it advantageous to devote resources into [recontracting 
within the framework of the existing rules]."331  When they are no longer 
motivated to invest into the current arrangement, then a change is in order.  
Applying this line of logic to China's landownership system, the question 
becomes: Has China's current land ownership system achieved 
"institutional equilibrium" where the economic actors are no longer 
motivated to make further investment into the land?   
 A strong argument can be made that a further change in land 
ownership is in order at least for rural land, as the urban land is believed to 
have been de facto privatized due to the longer term of the use right and the 
permitted transferability and mortgageability of such rights.  In contrast, 
farmers enjoy a shorter term of thirty years under the contracted land 
management rights, and such rights cannot be mortgaged under the 
Property Law.  As a result, the farmers' incentive to make further 
investments to the land has been severely reduced.  The lack of investment 
motivation is worsened by the rampant land seizures and illegal 
expropriations by the corrupt local governments to make quick and 
lucrative profits by converting land to commercial or industrial uses.  
Unlike the booming urban real estate market, where credibility tends to be 
more secure, the problematic collective ownership in the rural areas has 
proven to be much less credible, which calls for an institutional change.  
 Similar to the "lack of credibility" argument advanced above, a 
view has emerged among many that the next phase of China's reform will 
require more drastic institutional changes as the going gets tough.  Barry 
Naughton views China's economic reform as having a two-phase 
framework:  The first phase occurred during the period from 1978 through 
1993, and the second from 1993 to present.332  While, in his view, the 
policy focus for the first phase was to shift power and resources from the 
hands of central planners to local actors, the central agenda for the second 
phrase is to build a firmer institutional basis for the market economy.333  He 
argues that this policy shift would make China more closely resemble other 
transitional economies in that the much touted polar opposition between 
"big bang" and "gradualist" transitions may become less pronounced.334  He 
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predicts that China will face political challenges during the second phrase 
as it struggles to "develop a broader and sounder system of ownership, with 
a stronger, and more transparent system of property rights[.]" 335  
Naughton's view is shared by Peter Ho who believes that the institutional 
ambiguity has served China well for the development stage of the reform, 
however, further institutional reform in the land system must be carried out 
to avoid grave consequences.336   
4. A Practical Outlook 
a. Pros and Cons of Rural Ownership Privatization 
 It is one thing to establish that rural land ownership needs to be 
fixed, it is quite another to rush to the conclusion that outright privatization 
is the cure.  That said, many have engaged in heated, meaningful academic 
debates about the pros and cons of privatization.  Four of the most popular 
arguments against rural land privatization, together with their counter-
arguments, are summarized below.  Conspicuously missing from both sides 
are two elephants in the room: ideological constraints and technical 
difficulties involved in carrying out land privatization such as titling.  
Nonetheless, these arguments offer a feasibility study of privatization for 
current day rural China.   
 First, the policy of "land to the tiller" does not suit the current 
economic conditions of China's market economy.  The reasons are two-
fold.  Further fragmentation of rural land will reduce agricultural 
productivity.  In addition, the weakening bargaining power of an individual 
farmer or the household will most likely result in land concentration in the 
hands of a few due to market competition.337  They point to the failed 
experiment of land privatization in the early 1950s and the subsequent 
policy adjustment toward collectivism.338  Supporters of privatization have 
dismissed this view as absurd, for it erroneously presumes that farmers will 
either "squander" their land, or be less responsible toward their land than 
the corrupt local government officials who have been acting as the de facto 
owners of the rural land.339 
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 The second opposition is closely related to the first one. Holders of 
this view believe that land privatization will give rise to rural landlessness 
and large slums in cities.  This group points to the adverse social 
consequences that occurred in other formerly socialist countries, most 
notably Russia, as a result of a hasty rural land privatization, and social 
unrests due to landlessness existing in India and Brazil.340  In contrast, as 
one scholar points out, the reason "why China has no real slums in spite of 
its 200 million migrant workers" is that under the current land ownership, 
everyone of them has a piece of land in their home village that they can 
return to.341  Those who believe privatization is the right course of action 
argue that the number of landless peasants in China reached 70 million as 
of 2006 and is growing by 3 million each year.342 
 Third, privatizing rural land would lead to grain shortage and 
would jeopardize China's long-term mandate to ensure food security.343  
Two counter arguments are advanced to invalidate this view.  First, the 
food shortage concern might be an unrealistic, obsolete vestige of the Cold 
War Era and, therefore, in the age of globalization, this concern is perhaps 
unsound.   And second, some have argued that, to impose the burden of 
securing the nation's food supply on peasants alone is unfair, especially 
considering the alternative arrangements under which they could convert 
the land to capital.344  Admittedly, the grain shortage concern is a grave one 
considering the recent exacerbation of the loss of China's much needed 
arable land.        
 Lastly, some have argued that rural land privatization would delay 
China's urban expansion, as it will increase the transaction costs to urbanize 
farmland if ownership of the land is redistributed to individual farmers or 
households.345  This view has been criticized as meritless because again it 
advances urban interest to the detriment of China's rural population.346  On 
the contrary, some believe that the increasing commodification of rural 
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342 See generally Joshua Muldavin, Testimony to the U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission in 2006 at 186, available at www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2006/ 
annual_report_full_06.pdf. 
343 See Bezlova, supra note 327. 
344 Id. 
345 See Yuhui Li, The Necessity of Rural Land Privatization in China: A Matter of Both 
Equality and Efficiency (March 30, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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land resources, if unchecked by the state, will result in "a rapid 
concentration of land in the hand[s] of a mighty few."347 
b. Preliminary Thoughts on What Changes are Needed 
 In a critique of adopting a utilitarian approach to evaluating 
policies and institutions, Amartya Sen uses property rights as an 
example.348  He warns against judging a particular arrangement of property 
rights by their "constitutive features" alone; he believes the likely 
consequences of a particular arrangement should also be taken into 
consideration.349  To focus on the former alone will risk producing two 
equally inadequate "purist approaches," i.e., no restrictions on property, on 
the one hand, and abolition of private property on the other.  Holders of the 
first view "found it to be constitutive of individual independence and have 
gone on to ask that no restriction be placed on the ownership, inheritance 
and use of property, rejecting even the idea of taxing property or 
income."350  Others, repelled by inequalities of ownership, "have gone on to 
demand the abolition of private property."351  A perhaps more useful 
approach, Sen suggests, is to "examine the consequences of having-or not 
having-property rights."352  He then discusses two arguments supporting 
private property according to the consequentialist perspective.  On the one 
hand, private property has proved to be a "powerful engine of economic 
expansion and general prosperity;" on the other hand, unconstrained use of 
private property "can contribute to entrenched poverty and make it difficult 
to have social support for those who fall behind for reasons beyond their 
control."  Further, "it can also be defective in ensuring environmental 
preservation, and in the development of social infrastructure."353 
 Just as there does not exist a Blackstonian view of absolute 
dominion over a thing, there is no pure sense of absolute private ownership.  
As Sen cautions, the trick is to strike the right balance.  Disallowing private 
land ownership would risk harming efficiency and productivity; yet an 
 
347 See Peter Ho & Max Spoor, Whose Land?  The Political Economy of Land Titling in 
Transitional Economies, 23 LAND USE POL'Y 583 (2006).  
348 See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 60 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1999). 
349 Id. 
350  See Barry Bracewell-Milnes, Land and Heritage: The Public Interest in Personal 
Ownership, HOBART PAPER 93 (The Institute of Economic Affairs 1982) (arguing that 
"[l]and is not only a personal asset, being worth more to the owner than to strangers; it is 
also proprietary wealth, being worth more to society when owned by private persons than 
by the state or its agencies. . . [a]s both a personal asset and proprietary wealth, land is 
particularly unsuitable for government interferences; in state hands property rights become 
sterile." 
351 See SEN, supra note 348, at 60–61. 
352 Id. at 61. 
353 Id. 
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unconstrained private land ownership might lead to worsened poverty and 
greater social inequality.  The defining feature of the current property rights 
arrangement in China is privatization of use and management rights,354 
rather than ownership rights.  Some call this approach de facto 
privatization.  It starts out as an innovative device for the party-state to hold 
on to the imperative "public ownership" ideology, while creating economic 
incentives.  An unintended, positive consequence of this approach is that it 
not only echoes the concept of dianquan existing in the traditional Chinese 
land use system, but also coincides with the Hohfeldian view of placing 
property rights in a web of relations and the tendency of disintegration and 
fragmentation of property rights occurring elsewhere as identified by 
Donahue.355  Perhaps the pluralist approach to property ownership goes far 
beyond merely constraining private property rights.  But considering 
China's path dependence, not only its more recent Socialist legacy but also 
its long-run collectivist tradition, the focus should be on how to make the 
rural use and management rights more credible so as to motivate farmers' 
investment, rather than an outright privatization of rural land.   
 Although voices calling for rural land ownership privatization 
remain strong,356 the social cost of such a move outweighs its benefits.  As 
a tradeoff, the most pressing task, at the moment, is to make the use and 
management rights more credible through institutional capacity-building 
and to create more secure rights through both substantive and procedural 
guarantees.  Briefly stated, these include, inter alia, clarifying rural land 
ownership rights to eliminate ambiguity, extending the length of contract 
term for contracted management rights, allowing mortgageability of such 
rights, and improving rural land registration.  Essentially, this approach 
would level the playing field between the urban dwellers and the rural 
populace by according the later equally attractive rights without having to 
confront the potentially massive social cost that an outright privatization of 
rural land would trigger. 
 
 
354 See HO, supra note 156, at 192 (analogizing between China's privatization of land use 
rights to that under the British system where land is in name owned by the Crown but can be 
leased to legal persons).   
355 See discussions in Subpart III.A.1 supra. 
356 Among various privatization suggestions, one model is for the central government to 
consider allowing shareholder ownership of land by farmers to better protect them from 
abuses by local officials, also to protect China's arable land and guarantee food security.  
See Chan, supra note 327; see also Li, supra note 345.  
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IV. DEMOCRACY WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: POLITICAL 
RAMIFICATIONS OF THE INSTITUTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 North believes, in equilibrium, "a given structure of property rights 
[] will be consistent with a particular set of political rules [and] changes in 
one will induce changes in the other."357  Through economic analysis, he 
proves that the evolution of polities from single absolute rulers to 
democratic governments is a move toward greater political efficiency.358  
Conversely, "[o]ne gets efficient institutions by a polity that has built-in 
incentives to create and enforce efficient property rights."359  Take England 
for instance, he says, the built-in incentives include "[p]arliamentary 
supremacy, [] curtailment of royal prerogative powers, independence of the 
judiciary [], and the supremacy of the common law courts." 360 
 Milton Friedman echoes North's view, even though he puts it in a 
slightly different way.  He maintains that, between the two fundamental 
ways of coordinating economic activities, i.e., "central direction involving 
the use of coercion" and "voluntary co-operation of individuals," i.e., the 
market place, the latter is more valued because it promotes both economic 
and political freedom.361  He views economic freedom as not only an end in 
itself but also an indispensable means toward the achievement of political 
freedom.362   However, mindful that economic freedom is a necessary 
condition for political freedom, but not a sufficient condition, he warns that 
it is "possible to have economic arrangements that are fundamentally 
capitalist and political arrangements that are not free."363  Similarly, Joseph 
Stiglitz finds that "[e]conomic growth and development do not 
automatically confer personal freedom and civil rights."364  This view is 
proved by a bleak picture recently painted by Jerome Cohen of a persistent 
lack of political freedom and personal liberty in China despite its thriving 
economic growth,365 a deficiency that earned Deng's reform the title "partial 
reform."366      
 
357 See NORTH, supra note 2, at 48. 
358 See id. at 51. 
359 See id. at 140. 
360 See id. at 139. 
361 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 12–13 (1982). 
362 Id. at 8 . 
363 Id. at 8–10. 
364 See STIGLITZ, supra note 7, at 183–84. 
365 Jerome A. Cohen, 'Rightist' Wrongs, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2007; see also AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL, INTERNAL MIGRANTS: DISCRIMINATION AND ABUSE; THE HUMAN COST OF 
AN ECONOMIC 'MIRACLE' (London: Amnesty International Mar. 2007), available at 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/ASA170082007ENGLISH /$FILE/ASA1700807.pdf. 
366 See Carl M. Rose, Privatization - The Road to Democracy? 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 691 
(2006) (arguing that modern privatization efforts, especially state-led ones, do not 
necessarily lead to democracy). 
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 The Great Debate about democracy and China has spawned a great 
deal of literature that devotes to analyzing, speculating, and forecasting 
China's political future, some more hopeful than others.367  It is certainly 
tantalizing to join the debate, but to tackle such an all-encompassing 
universe would have been overly ambitious for this paper.  That said, the 
indispensability of political institutions to property rights arrangements 
makes it impossible to ignore political ramifications of China's de facto 
privatization of property rights.  Therefore, Part IV attempts to inquire into 
China's political future by examining with brevity a much narrower issue, 
i.e., how the de facto privatization of property rights will contribute to the 
emerging rights consciousness among China's citizens, in both urban and 
rural settings, and thereby furnish the bedrock for democracy to come in 
China.  To put it differently, will China's nascent recognition of private 
property rights ultimately lead to China's political liberalization?  
A. Rights Consciousness on the Rise 
 Those who are influenced by notable Western liberal thinkers such 
as John Locke and Freidrich Hayek hope that China's recent privatization 
effort will awaken a sense of individual autonomy and inalienable rights 
among its people.368  Others dismiss this possibility by pointing to the 
utilitarian and right-averse nature of recent Chinese legalization.  Neil 
Diamant et al., for instance, view Chinese law and legality as a conflict 
management tactic and an outlet for expressing grievances. 369   They 
believe, unlike its Western counterparts, the Chinese legalization program 
is neither generated by liberal enlightenment nor by social negotiations 
between the state and the rising bourgeoisie.370  Rather, it echoes a long-
standing statist orientation which accorded the state a key, proactive role in 
political, economic, and social development. 371  In this sense, law and 
rights are essential to the regime because it contributes to a more orderly 
society rather than to empowering the citizenry.372 
 
367 See, e.g., BRUCE GILLEY, CHINA'S DEMOCRATIC FUTURE (Columbia Univ. Press 2004); cf. 
An Chen, Why Does Capitalism Fail to Push China Toward Democracy? in CHINA'S 
EMERGENT POLITICAL ECONOMY: CAPITALISM IN THE DRAGON'S LAIR 146, 146-65 
(Christopher A. McNally  ed., 2008).   
368 Locke believes that the right to property was so fundamental that government's primary 
purpose was to protect that right.  See C. B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF 
POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE (1964).  Hayek claims that the system of 
private property is the most important guaranty of freedom. See FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, 
THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 103 (1944). 
369 NEIL J. DIAMANT, STANLEY B. LUBMAN, AND KEVIN J. O'BRIEN, ENGAGING THE LAW IN 
CHINA:  STATE, SOCIETY, AND POSSIBILITIES FOR JUSTICE 6–7 (2005). 
370 Id. at 6. 
371 Id. 
372 Id. 
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 As a response to mounting grievances in both urban and rural 
areas, China's legislature has shifted its focus toward social legislation.  It 
is reported that, in the NPC's effort to shift the focus from regulating 
economic matters to resolving social issues, social legislation has increased 
rapidly in recent years since the commencement of the 10th NPC in 2003, 
and reached 20 percent at the NPC level and 40 percent at the provincial 
and lower levels in the past five years, compared to a mere 4.7 percent 
prior to 2003.373  As Minxin Pei identifies, rapid economic and legal 
development has created a more hospitable environment for individuals to 
utilize the system, assert their rights and challenge the regime.374  Law and 
legal system, as observed by Alford, have become a "double edged sword" 
for the party-state: 
the regime has not only through its law provided a legal, 
moral, and political vocabulary with which those who wish 
to take it to task might articulate their concerns, but also 
has proffered these individuals a singular platform from 
which their concerns might be broadcast.  In seeking to 
deploy formal legality for highly instrumental purposes, 
the regime has unwittingly handed its opponents a keenly 
honed instrument through which to seek to accomplish 
their own, very different ends.375  
 Naturally, the process of utilizing the system has also increased 
overall rights consciousness among ordinary people.  According to a public 
opinion survey conducted in as early as 1993, nearly 80 percent of the 
respondents agreed with the statement that "[p]rivate property is sacred and 
must not be violated," and two-thirds opposed the suggestion that the 
"government may confiscate private property under any circumstances in 
the national interest."376  Rights consciousness among China's citizens has 
risen to a new level along with the sweeping privatization of urban housing 
since the late 1990s and presumably more so with the passing of the 
Property Law. 
 
373 Focus is on Property Law, CHINA DAILY, March 14, 2008 (noting that according to the 
Director of the Law Institute of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, only 4.7 percent of 
new legislation passed by the four National People's Congress (NPC) prior to 2003 were on 
social issues, but commercial matters accounted for 36.5 percent). 
374 Minxin Pei, Rights and Resistance: The Changing Contexts of the Dissident Movement, 
in CHINESE SOCIETY, 2ND EDITION: CHANGE, CONFLICT AND RESISTANCE 23 (Elizabeth J. 
Perry & Mark Selden eds., 2003).  
375 Alford, supra note 269, at 62. 
376 Pei, supra note 374, at 40–41. 
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1. Grassroots Urban Resistance Movement 
 As alluded to in Subpart III.D.1 above, urban home ownership has 
given rise to one of the most contentious issues in China as the entire 
nation is going through a urban renewal craze.  Disputes over 
compensation, forced demolition and compulsory eviction to distant 
suburbs abound in the demolition and relocation process.  In addition, 
wealthier owners of modern flats in new residential neighborhoods and 
luxury homes in gated communities have organized homeowners' 
associations to fight abuses by the developers and property management 
companies.377  To protect their rights, homeowners have resorted to voting, 
demonstration, protest, self-administration 378  against the intermediate 
players such as developers, and collective civil resistance against the 
government.379   
 For instance, in June 2007, residents living in shared facilities in 
north-east Beijing, Jiuxianqiao, voted to accept an offer from a developer to 
demolish their buildings.380  In the high-profile Chongqing "nail house" 
case mentioned earlier, the property owners, unlike their neighbors, refused 
to vacate their two-story brick building to give way to a major property 
developer and stood firm as construction began around them.381  They 
remained there even after a court deadline ordering them to allow 
demolition had expired.382  The image of a lone brick building standing tall 
amid the huge construction pit, with a banner reading: "The legal private 
property of citizens cannot be violated," had spread all over the internet, 
making the case a national cause célèbre.383  The lone "nail house" may 
have invoked, in the minds of some people, the iconic image of the lone 
protester who single-handedly halted the progress of military tanks on 
Tian'anmen Square in 1989.  The fact that the owners of the "nail house" 
fought for protection of their private property rights as basic human rights 
 
377 Yongshun Cai, China's Moderate Middle Class: The Case of Homeowners' Resistance, 
45 ASIAN SURVEY 777 (Sept/Oct. 2005); see also Benjamin L. Read, Property Rights and 
Homeowner Activism in New Neighborhoods, in PRIVATIZING CHINA 41 (Li Zhang & Aihwa 
Ong ed., 2008) (noting Homeowners' Associations are state-sanctioned).  
378 See Read, supra note 377 (indicating that a Homeowners' Association is a state-
sanctioned organization for self-administration by residents).   
379  See Yongshun Cai, Civil Resistance and Rule of Law in China: The Defense of 
Homeowners' Rights, in GRASSROOTS POLITICAL REFORM IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 174 
(Elizabeth Perry & Merle Goldman, eds. 2007).  See also Benjamin L. Read, Inadvertent 
Political Reform via Private Associations:  Assessing Homeowners' Groups in New 
Neighborhoods, in GRASSROOTS POLITICAL REFORM IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 149 
(Elizabeth Perry & Merle Goldman, eds. 2007). 
380 See One Household, One Vote, THE ECONOMIST, Jul. 12, 2007. 
381 Rui, supra note 317. 
382 Id. 
383  Woman Defies Chinese Developers, BBC NEWS, Jan. 7, 2008, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6483997.stm. 
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and the moral support they received from the public and the Chinese media 
bear testimony to the much heightened awareness of property rights among 
the ordinary Chinese.       
 According to an investigation conducted by Luigi Tomba of the so-
called weiquan ("protect your rights") movement in some of Beijing's gated 
residential communities, the new spatial and organizational autonomy 
brought about by the homeownership experience not only helped form a 
new culture among the residents but also became a catalyst in the formation 
of their collective identities.384  Even though conflicts and protests within 
the group are reoriented toward intermediate players, such as local 
institutions, developers and property managers, rather than toward the state 
and its policies, their new identify and sub-culture increase their awareness 
of rights and motivations to defend those rights and, as such, redefine their 
relationship with the state.385  According to Tomba, among the court-
reported disputes, housing related disputes have experienced a 42 percent 
increase from 1997 to 2000 nationwide.386 
   In their study of a collective resistance action directed at the 
government sustained by homeowners in Shanghai, Fayong Shi and 
Yongshun Cai find that, taking advantage of connections or social networks 
of the action participants and exploiting the discrepant, and often 
fragmented, interests of different levels of state authorities had helped 
create opportunities for successful resistance by the homeowners.387  A 
perhaps more interesting observation is that "the unique social networks 
blur the boundary of the state and society, and make political participation, 
or the way citizens exercise political influence, more subtle and perhaps 
more effective.”388  Consequently, the efforts by the Chinese middle class 
appear largely moderate due to “their intention to maintain the political 
order and limited ability to stage disruptive action."389 
2. Rural Resistance 
  As noted earlier, an even more urgent and threatening problem 
confronts the regime in rural China.  Chinese farmers are much more land-
bound than their urban cousins.  Despite China's sweeping industrialization, 
it remains an agrarian society.  Not only have the farmers been left behind 
by the economic reform but they also continue to be victimized by a 
 
384 Luigi Tomba, Residential Space and Collective Interest Formation in Beijing's Housing 
Disputes, 185 CHINA Q. 934, 934–51 (2005). 
385 Id. at 951. 
386 Id. at 935. 
387 Fayong Shi  & Yongshun Cai, Disaggregating the State: Networks and Collective 
Resistance in Shanghai, 186 China Q. 314 (2006).  
388 Id. at 332.  
389 Cai, supra note 379. 
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perpetual policy bias favoring the city-dwellers.  Their plight is exacerbated 
by the ill-defined rural collective land ownership, which has fueled land 
seizures by corrupt local government officials for illegal personal gains and 
local revenues.  As highlighted by the "Fujin privatization movement" 
discussed in Part III.D.2 above, today's farmers are better equipped with 
communication and organizational skills, making them more threatening to 
the regime.   
 According to Cai, local governments' reluctance to pay reasonable 
compensation for farmers who lost farmland is a major source of rural 
conflicts today.390  Among the mass confrontations between farmers and the 
police in 2004 that he analyzed, about 67 percent were land-use related; 
and among the land related confrontations, 55 percent occurred because 
farmers tried to prevent construction on land that had been taken away 
from them.391  The nature of the confrontations could be quite violent, 
involving fatalities of farmers, due to the high stakes the farmers had in the 
land and because often times collective resistance such as confrontation 
was their last resort after their peaceful petitions failed.392  Since the central 
government rarely intervenes unless it feels the pressure of protecting 
stability or regime legitimacy, few protests receive media coverage and 
most were suppressed by the local governments.393 
3. Emergence of Civil Society           
 The reconfiguration of Chinese society as a result of economic 
freedom has led to a diversity of interests that, in some instances, give rise 
to the freedom of association.  According to Bruce Gilley, there were 
135,000 officially registered "social groups" in China by the end of 2002, 
among which more than half were sub-national level groups, representing 
groups as diverse as women, environmental causes, new religions, and 
charities, in addition to homeowners.394  Gilley observes, despite fantasies 
of an orientalist bonding between state and society, all evidence shows that 
civil society in China is developing in opposition to state power, which 
some in the leadership see as potentially posing a serious threat to political 
stability and unity. 395   Many believe that the gradual creation and 
 
390 See Yongshun Cai, Local Governments and the Suppression of Popular Resistance in 
China, 93 CHINA Q. 24, 26 (2008). 
391 Id. at 34. 
392 Id.. 
393 Id. at 27–35. 
394 GILLEY, supra note 367, at 72–77. 
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development of a civil society is "creating favorable conditions for China's 
future democracy."396  
4. State-Sponsored Village Election         
 To quench rural conflicts preemptively, the central government has 
initiated numerous state-sponsored reform measures on both village and 
township levels, ranging from village election, village assemblies, and the 
cadre responsibility and evaluation system, with mixed success.397  As 
Elizabeth Perry and Merle Goldman observe, even though such measures 
are state-sponsored, they are reconfiguring local politics in surprising and 
significant ways.398 
 So far the most successful state-sponsored reform mechanism 
remains village elections, which reportedly have been conducted in over 80 
percent of China's villages.399  The Organic Law of Village Committees 
was passed in 1987 to give villagers the opportunity to elect village 
officials and establish a number of democratic institutions for village 
governance, and to permit villagers to monitor local cadres and allow 
villagers to elect a leader and a village committee.400 
 Despite the active participation by villagers across China, some 
have cast serious doubt on village election as a mode of grassroots self-
government.  They view China's village elections as a measure to improve 
local governance in order to buttress regime stability, and warn of the 
danger that China's current grassroots political reforms might help forestall 
rather than facilitate the advance of formal democracy at the national 
level. 401   Perry and Goldman argue that "[d]eferring progress toward 
national political reform in favor of dealing with the immediate challenge 
of curbing corrupt local cadres may be viewed as an acceptable tradeoff by 
ordinary Chinese citizens, for whom abusive and rapacious local officials 
pose the more urgent and immediate concern." 402  They do acknowledge 
 
396  ELIZABETH PERRY & MERLE GOLDMAN, GRASSROOTS POLITICAL REFORM IN 
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 1, 16 (2007). 
397 Id. at 14–15. 
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of Accountability in Rural China, in GRASSROOTS POLITICAL REFORM IN CONTEMPORARY 
CHINA 117, 120 (Elizabeth Perry & Merle Goldman, eds. 2007); John James Kennedy, The 
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that, despite their top-down nature, whether these reforms are working to 
empower or imperil the party-state remains unclear.403   
B.  Counterforces at Work 
 The responsiveness demonstrated by the CCP in the economic 
sphere is part and parcel of its perennial struggle for legitimacy.  
Weatherley observes that, throughout the history of the PRC, the CCP has 
utilized traditional legitimacy, which lies somewhere in between 
charismatic legitimacy and legal rational legitimacy, ideology legitimacy in 
the Mao era, and performance based legitimacy during the Deng era, i.e., a 
combination of economic legitimacy and legal rational legitimacy.404  The 
Tian'anmen student movement has taught the regime that economic 
legitimacy alone would not suffice.  In fact, Samuel Huntington's warnings 
seem to ring true that, "[r]eform can be a catalyst for revolution rather than 
a substitute for it” and that “[t]he very fact that a regime makes reforms and 
grants concessions encourages demands for still more changes which can 
easily snowball into a revolutionary movement."405  The collapse of the 
former Soviet Union and its swift dismemberment caused by its bold 
political reforms still loom large as a negative example in the minds of 
Chinese leaders.406  Meanwhile, the regime is increasingly aware of the 
mutual reinforcement between economic reform and political liberalization  
as well as the inevitability of political reform.  While preemptively 
experimenting with state-sponsored reform measures, such as village 
elections, the CCP looked elsewhere and found social stability as a means 
of legitimacy,407 as reflected by the main thrust of Hu Jintao's signature 
ideology, "harmonious society."   
 As China emerges from its isolated past onto the international 
stage, the CCP has increasingly sought to identity itself as "a nationalist 
force, transforming China into an economic superpower and standing firm 
against attempts by foreign governments to undermine its process."408  
Historically, Chinese nationalism has inspired pro-democracy movements, 
such as the May Fourth enlightenment movement of 1919, against 
tyrannical rulers.409  In present day China, along with the emergence of a 
property-owning middle class, the desire of its citizens to build a cultural 
and national identify that is uniquely Chinese is ever so strong.  As Yingjie 
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405 SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 363 (Yale University 
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406 PERRY & GOLDMAN, supra note 396, at 17. 
407 WEATHERLEY, supra note 236, at 14. 
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Guo describes, this identity is said to be "a new culture, a new mode of 
knowledge, a new socio-political and cultural-moral system, 'a framework 
of universal values, which contains the best of East and West, past and 
present', and a 'Chinese' alternative to modernity."410   
 However, the CCP has mastered the art of invoking and buttressing 
nationalism at appropriate times to reinforce its legitimacy.  Deng himself 
invoked the name of the "Yellow Emperor" upon signing the agreement 
with Britain over the return of Hong Kong.411  The political elites in China 
increasingly realize the role of what Joseph Nye called "soft power" in 
international politics.  A key political adviser to Jiang Zemin notes that the 
"power shift" taking place in international politics from the "reliance on 
violence and wealth" to "a knowledge-based power structure" and that 
control over knowledge will become the focal point in future global power 
politics.412  He advocates that China ought to maintain its own position and 
orientation, come up with strategies to enhance its "soft power," legitimize 
its power, and make its culture attractive to others.413    
 As demonstrated by the events surrounding the global protests 
against the Chinese policy toward Tibet and China's Olympic torch relay 
around the globe in 2008 and the subsequent anti-West protests by young 
nationalist Chinese students both within and beyond China, a distinct 
possibility exists where the CCP hijacks its citizens’ fervent nationalism 
and turns it into a unifying force between itself and the emerging middle 
class, thereby thwarting the process of political liberalization.  However, it 
may turn out to be a "double-edged sword."  One can never underestimate 
the critical importance of mass mobilization in China.  The CCP is acutely 
aware of the irony as well as the danger of mishandling nationalist 
sentiment as it may turn its back and challenge rather than boost the 
regime's legitimacy.414 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 The collective ownership and control of real property in China was 
established in 1949 when the CCP took control.  More than half a century 
later, the rapid economic transformation taking place within China has 
 
410 YINGJIE GUO, CULTURAL NATIONALISM IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA: THE SEARCH FOR 
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resulted in the reemergence of private property rights and de-
collectivization of rural lands.  The question of "who owns what" has never 
been so vital and pressing.  To recognize the fruits of economic reform and 
to reinforce its performance-based legitimacy, the party-state codified its de 
facto privatization of real property rights, particularly in urban centers, to 
signal its determination to carry forward China's thriving market economy.  
Coming out of a self-imposed isolation three decades ago, China was soon 
greeted by industrialization, urbanization, and privatization.  They came 
roughly in that order, but all three are here to stay.  Un-disoriented and 
unfazed, the party-state steadfastly plods down the path charted by the 
"architect" of its reform policy - a path called "Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics."             
Just like Wesley Hohfeld's groundbreaking analysis of "rights" 
renders it possible for us to define "liberty" (an absence both of a duty and 
of a right), 415  I hope an examination of "Socialism with Chinese 
characteristics" through China's real property rights as an institution would 
enable us to pause and gain a new perspective on what it means to be 
uniquely Chinese in both economic and political spheres, free from the 
ideological pre-conceptions the party-state envisaged.  Compelled by 
political survival and guided by unwavering pragmatism, the party-state 
has loosened its tight grip over its people to unleash the largest workforce 
the world had yet to see.  The co-existence and entanglement of public and 
private, collective and individual, "us" and "self" have reconfigured the 
contemporary Chinese social fabric.  But however much has changed, one 
thing remains the same: The constant negotiation between the ruler and its 
constituents.                   
 Economically, through negotiation, the pendulum swings between 
decentralization/privatization and collectivization.  When the behavior of 
political and economic actors becomes self-enforcing, it creates credible 
commitment for its economy to steadily grow.  The great divide between 
town and country exposes serious defects in China's property law regime.  
More credible and secure land tenure is necessary not only to motivate the 
performance but also to build the capacity of the Chinese peasantry.  
Politically, through negotiation, the pendulum swings between the 
tendency to converge and the tendency to diverge between the ruler and its 
constituents.  Privatization of property rights has awaken a sense of "self," 
and thus autonomy, among the constituents.   
 As is increasingly clear, more thorough marketization of the 
economy erodes the party-state's control over the economy.  Along with 
more economic freedom, the beneficiaries of the economic reform demand 
for more secure protection of their wealth, while those who are left behind 
call for equal opportunity to participate in profits.  With widely available 
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modern technology at their disposal, Chinese citizens across the nation are 
capable of organizing themselves at unprecedented speed.  As Mao 
famously heeded: "A single spark can start a prairie fire."  Decentralization 
and divergent interests cause fragmentation between the central and local 
governments as well as among different regions.  The enhanced rights 
consciousness among the citizens, coupled with the power fragmentation 
within the government, is a force to be reckoned with.  It is not a question 
of whether, but a question of when and how, this force will be put to use to 
fragment the party-state's political monopoly. 
 If liberty is indeed the absence of both a "duty" and of a "right," 
then liberalization is the process it takes to reach that state, a state perhaps 
we can call freedom.  Freedom is achievable if we begin with a better 
delineation of "rights."  Similarly, if property rights in China are 
"rectified," to borrow from Confucius, China should be on its way to 
attaining the state called freedom. 
